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The State of Education Reform in
Rhode Island:
Tangled Up in a Blue State
Anthony F. Cottone, Esq.*
INTRODUCTION
On February 17, 2009, the Commissioner of the Rhode Island
Department of Elementary and Secondary Education directed the
Superintendent of Schools for the Providence Public School
Department ("PPSD") to introduce "criterion-based hiring and job
assignment processes" for teachers (the "CBH Directive").'
Although the Commissioner did not linger on precisely what he
meant by "criterion-based" policies, he did make clear that these
policies were to be "driven by student need rather than by
* The author is a graduate of Columbia College and St. Johns University
School of Law, where he was Executive Notes and Comments Editor of the
Law Review. He has been admitted to practice law in Rhode Island,
Massachusetts, New York and Connecticut and presently is a solo
practitioner in Providence, Rhode Island, as well as Deputy City Solicitor for
that city. The views expressed herein are solely those of the author and do
not reflect those of the City of Providence, any public official, or the
Providence School Board. Copyright © 2012 Anthony F. Cottone.
1. See Letter from Peter McWalters, former R.I. Educ. Commissioner,
to Thomas M. Brady, former Providence Sch. Superintendent at 3 (Feb. 17,
2009) (on file with author) [hereinafter CBH Directive]. Under the
Providence Home Rule Charter (the "Charter"), the Superintendent serves at
the pleasure of the School Board and acts as its administrative agent. See
PROVIDENCE, R.I., HOME RuLE CHARTER, art. 7, § 706(c), available at
http://library.municode.com/index.aspx?clientID=14446&stateID=39&statena
me=Rhode%20Island, quoted, infra, at note 102.
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seniority." 2
The Providence School Board viewed the deceptively simple
directive as merely reflecting an existing mandate under the
state's Basic Education Program, and believed that compliance
was within its management prerogative and thus not a proper
subject for collective bargaining. On the other hand, the
Providence Teachers Union, AFT Local 958, AFL-CIO ("PTU"),
viewed the CBH Directive as a frontal attack upon seniority, one
of its bedrock principles, which is enshrined throughout its
collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") with the School Board.
Thus, the teachers union mounted a federal court challenge to the
2. See CBH Directive, supra note 1, at 3. The section on Human
Capital within the Basic Education Program Regulations promulgated by the
Board of Regents for Elementary and Secondary Education, dated June 4,
2009, provides that:
Improving achievement requires recruitment of talented educators
driven by strategic human capital management. Human capital
management involves the practices of recruiting, developing,
rewarding and retaining talented and demonstrably successful staff.
The human capital management system enables the [Local
Education Agency] to address the following functions: Recruit,
Support and Retain Highly Effective Staff; Use Information for
Planning and Accountability, and Ensure Equity and Adequacy of
Fiscal and Human Resources. In order to effectively meet these
functions, each LEA shall maintain control of its ability to recruit,
hire, manage, evaluate, and assign its personnel.
Each LEA shall develop, implement, and monitor a human capital
management system that is connected to its educational
improvement strategy, and supports the people with the knowledge
and skills necessary to execute that strategy. Human capital
management systems shall adhere to standards and state
regulations that relate to professional knowledge, skills, and
competencies expected of all staff.
R.I. BD. OF REGENTS FOR ELEMENTARY & SECONDARY EDUC., BASIC EDUC.
PROGRAM REGULATIONS, § G-15-2.2 (2009); see also Jennifer D. Jordan,
Teacher Contract Turmoil, PROVIDENCE J., April 3, 2011, at Al. The literature
on the efficacy of banning teacher staffing policies based solely upon seniority
is mixed. Compare, e.g., JESSICA LEVIN, JENNIFER MULHERN & JOAN SCHUNCK,
UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES: THE CASE FOR REFORMING THE STAFFING RULES
IN URBAN TEACHERS UNION CONTRACTS 32 (2005), available at
http://tntp.org/files/UnintendedConsequences.pdf (school districts should
eliminate all transfer provisions that require or allow voluntary transfers to
be forced onto schools based upon seniority), with William S. Koski & Eileen
L. Horng, Facilitating the Teacher Quality Gap? Collective Bargaining
Agreements, Teacher Hiring and Transfer Rules, and Teacher Assignment
Among Schools in California, 2 EDU. FIN. & POL'Y, 262, 262-300 (2007)
(finding no effect).
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School Department's "criterion-based" hiring and assignment
policy within months of its promulgation. 3
In fact, protracted disagreement over CBH and seniority-
related issues created what would-be education reformers in
Providence might describe as a perfect storm: they were a factor in
the decisions to resign made by the City's Superintendent of
Schools4 and its School Board President,5 and at least contributed
to an environment in which the City's new mayor felt it necessary
in February 2011 to preliminarily dismiss all 1934 teachers
employed by the City, 6 just as the state's new governor was
replacing the chairman and four members of the Board of Regents
for Elementary and Secondary Education.7  Indeed, ongoing
conflict between the reform-minded School Board and the new
Providence mayor concerning these issues was put to rest (at least
temporarily) only after state-wide legislation was enacted
transferring the "power and duty" to negotiate and "enter into"
CBAs from the School Board to the Mayor.8
Yet, despite all the legal maneuvering, resignations, teacher
dismissals and legislation, the question posed by the union's legal
challenge to the CBH Directive, i.e., whether and to what extent a
3. See Complaint, Providence Teachers Union v. Brady, C.A. No. 09-356
(D.R.I. July 17, 2009), ECF No. 1. Some of the same issues have been raised
in a pending Superior Court action commenced by the Portsmouth School
Committee. See Portsmouth Sch. Comm. v. NEA Portsmouth, C.A. No. PC
11-3239, slip op. at 1-2 (R.I. Super. Ct. Nov. 7, 2011), available at
http://www.courts.ri.gov/Courts/SuperiorCourt/DecisionsOrders/decisions/11-
3239.pdf. The issues were also touched upon in a case involving East
Providence Schools. E. Providence Sch. Comm. v. E. Providence Educ. Ass'n,
C.A. No. PB 09-1421, slip. op. at 3-4 (R.I. Super. Ct. Mar. 15, 2010), available
at http://www.courts.ri.gov/Courts/SuperiorCourt/DecisionsOrders/09-
1421.pdf. An appeal in the East Providence case is pending and is scheduled
for argument before the Rhode Island Supreme Court this term. Both cases
are discussed at infra Part I.A.
4. See Linda Borg, Schools Chief Makes Rounds One Last Time,
PROVIDENCE J., July 16, 2011, at Al.
5. See Linda Borg, School Board Leader Resigns, PROVIDENCE J., July
12, 2011, at Al.
6. See Linda Borg, Board Votes to Dismiss Teachers, PROVIDENCE J.,
Feb. 25, 2011, at Al; see also infra Part I.B.
7. See Jennifer D. Jordan, A New Start for Education Board,
PROVIDENCE J., Apr. 1, 2011, at A10.
8. See Act of June 21, 2011, Ch. 265, § 1, 2011 R.I. Gen. Laws Adv.
Legis. Serv. (LexisNexis) (amending R.I. GEN. LAws §16-2-9 (a)(18), (c)); see
also infra at Part I.A.
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state regulatory agency in Rhode Island can abrogate seniority
principles enshrined in a teacher's contract, remains unanswered,
at least as of this writing. The fundamental difference of opinion
that prompted the union to call the question reflects a power
struggle over whether seniority should continue to be the
dominant factor controlling the manner by which teachers are
hired and assigned in our public schools, a struggle which is
taking place, in one form or another, in many urban communities
across the nation which, like Providence, are attempting to cope
with an alarming lack of school funding while at the same time
coming to grips with the catastrophic failure of their public schools
to actually educate children.9
Obtaining clarity with respect to seniority-related issues is
9. See generally STEVEN BRILL, CLASs WARFARE: INSIDE THE FIGHT TO Fix
AMERICA'S SCHOOLS (2011); DIANE RAVITCH, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF THE
GREAT AMERICAN SCHOOL SYSTEM (2010). Both books have been reviewed by
the author. See Anthony F. Cottone, Book Reviews, R.I. B. J. (forthcoming
2012). Despite the fact that federal education funding to local schools has
increased by some forty percent since 2001, Brill notes that "we're not just
behind-way behind-countries like China, South Korea, and Japan, whose
educated masses our media typically depict as threatening out
competitiveness. We're also behind Estonia, Slovenia, Poland, Norway, New
Zealand, Canada, and the Netherlands." BRILL, supra at 27 (citing a 2010
study of the International Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development). Brill adds that "our minorities and the poor rank so far below
the low national average that they're basically at or near the bottom among
the developed countries." Id. In addition, he claims "[w]e are now spending
about 50 percent more per student than what other developed nations spend
(and about 60 percent more than South Korea, for example), while our
children continue to stagnate or fall farther behind." Id.
Unfortunately, Rhode Island's statistics, especially in its cities, are no
exception. For example, based on up-to-date New England Common
Assessment Program ("NECAP") results, in Providence-a district where 84%
of students come from families with incomes at or below 185% of the federal
poverty level, 45% of students come from non-English speaking households,
and forty-seven distinct languages are spoken-49% of fourth graders were at
or above proficiency levels for reading and 42% were at or above proficiency
levels for math, as compared with 69% and 63% proficiency levels (for math
and reading, respectively) statewide. Additionally, 44% of eighth graders in
Providence were proficient in reading, and 25% in math, as compared with
74% and 54% statewide. See EDUCATION WORKING GROUP, EDUCATE
PROVIDENCE: A REPORT OF THE EDUCATION OPPORTUNITY WORKING GROUP 10
(2011), available at http://providenceri.com/efile/1695. In addition,
Providence has a high school graduation rate of 68%, as compared with a
statewide rate of 76%. Id. NECAP results are available at the RIDE website
located at http://www.ride.ri.gov/Assessment/Results.aspx.
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complicated by the frequent inability of arbitrators, hearing
officers and judges to accurately identify issues that should be
exempt from collective bargaining. Effectively distinguishing
between issues that, in the words of the Rhode Island Supreme
Court, involve "the essence of the educational mission,"10 and
those which, to quote a relevant Rhode Island labor statute,
primarily "concern[] hours, salary, working conditions, and all
other terms and conditions of professional employment,"'' is made
more difficult by the variety of interested stakeholders that may
be involved in their resolution. Indeed, decision makers have
struggled not only with the substantive distinction, but also with
deciding which court, department, or agency should make it.
Part I of the article will recount recent events in Providence
in some detail as they illustrate many of the structural roadblocks
to meaningful education reform more poignantly than any merely
theoretical legal discussion. Part II will explore the light recent
events can shed on the central task of balancing a school board's
management rights and duties with its statutory duty to bargain
collectively and comply with existing Collective Bargaining
Agreements ("CBAs"), a task that likely will confront an
increasing number of cities and towns throughout the state, as
well as the Rhode Island Supreme Court.12 Part III will explore
how various stakeholders, as well as the federal and state courts,
may become involved in resolving ongoing debates over public
education policy. And finally, in Part IV, the article will make
some concluding observations and suggestions. 13
10. See N. Providence Sch. Comm. v. N. Providence Fed'n of Teachers,
945 A.2d 339, 347 (R.I. 2008).
11. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-9.3-2 (2003).
12. See, e.g., E. Providence Sch. Comm. v. E. Providence Educ. Ass'n,
C.A. No. PB 09-1421 (R.I. Super. Ct. Mar. 15, 2010), available at
http://www.courts.ri.gov/Courts/SuperiorCourt/DecisionsOrders/09-1421.pdf
(an appeal to the Rhode Island Supreme Court is currently pending).
13. The following acronyms and abbreviations will be used throughout
the article: Rhode Island Board of Regents for Elementary and Secondary
Education ("Board of Regents"), Basic Education Program ("BEP"), Basic
Education Program Regulations ("BEP Regs"), City of Providence ("City"),
Providence School Board ("PSB" or "School Board"), Providence Public School
Department ("PPSD" or "School Department"), Providence Teachers Union,
AFT Local 958, AFL-CIO ("PTU"), and Rhode Island Department of
Elementary and Secondary Education ("RIDE").
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I. THE RESPONSE TO AN EDUCATION CRISIS IN PROVIDENCE
In April 2009, the PPSD complied with the CBH Directive
that had been issued by RIDE some three months earlier by
promulgating a policy for the criterion-based hiring and
assignment of teachers (the "PPSD CBH Policy").1 4 In order to
understand this new CBH policy and appreciate the PTU's
reaction to its promulgation, one must have some understanding
of the CBA between the parties.
Under the Providence CBA then in effect, an annual job fair
was held by the PPSD each summer at which senior teachers had
the right to occupy any teaching position held by a more junior
teacher. As long as they were qualified, a senior teacher could
"bump" a junior teacher from his or her position.15 The ensuing
annual cascade of bumping, as bumped junior teachers proceeded
to bump even more junior teachers and so on, was an
administrative nightmare and became a hot button issue among
parents, who watched as popular junior teachers disappeared from
their children's schools. By contrast, the CBH Policy promulgated
in 2009 eliminated bumping and provided that teachers would be
hired pursuant to an interview process supervised by a hiring
committee responsible for scoring applicants with reference to five
teacher competencies.16
14. The promulgated PPSD CBH Policy was approved by RIDE on
March 25, 2009. See City of Providence v. Providence Teachers Union, C.A.
No. PC 11-2526 (R.I. Super. May 3, 2011). The Plaintiffs' memo seeking
expedited review is available at http://www.providenceschools.org/medial
140345/dja%20memo%20support.pdf.
15. See Collective Bargaining Agreement (expired) between the
Providence School Board and the Providence Teachers Union arts. 8, 11-12
(June 28, 2004) (on file with author).
16. See Providence Public School Department, Mediated Criterion-Based
Hiring Policy 7 (2011), available at http://www.betterprovidence.org/wp-
content/uploads/2011/09/CBH-Final-Mediated-Version-2.pdf [hereinafter
Mediated CBH Policy]. Under the Policy, applications are reviewed by the
principal and a committee and given between one and twenty points on each
of five teacher competencies: content knowledge and pedagogy, achievement,
critical thinking, communication skills, and professional engagement. See id.
at 18 n.vii.
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A. The PTU's First Federal Lawsuit and the Mediated CBH
Policy
The PTU filed a complaint in federal court some three months
after the PPSD CBH Policy was put into effect 17 and alleged that
the CBH Directive had violated state labor law by in effect
requiring that PPSD violate its CBA, which, as noted, made hiring
decisions solely a function of seniority, a practice now prohibited
by RIDE.18 The City moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of
federal jurisdiction, but before the jurisdictional issue could be
decided the parties agreed to mediate and finally agreed on
October 20, 2010 to submit a tentatively agreed upon version of a
CBH policy (the "Mediated CBH Policy") to the PTU rank and file
and School Board for possible ratification.
Under the Mediated CBH Policy, applicants for teaching
positions would automatically be awarded a maximum ten out of a
possible one hundred points solely on the basis of seniority, and
the five most senior applicants for each position would have to be
invited to interview, regardless of their scores. 19 In addition, a
displaced PTU teacher would have the right to be placed in any
vacant position for which he or she was qualified pursuant to a
process designed to match teacher and principal preferences, to be
conducted without external candidates prior to the
commencement of the regular CBH hiring process. 20
The School Board formally rejected the Mediated Policy and
made clear its categorical objection to any form of bumping.
Eventually, the Board approved a new policy of its own which did
not include any scoring or other preferences based solely upon a
teacher's seniority or a pre-CBH match process for displaced
teachers.21 Soon thereafter, the PPSD Superintendent, who had
17. See Complaint, supra note 3, at 2.
18. See id. at 7 (citing R.I. GEN. LAws § 28-7-1 to -49 (2003) and R.I. GEN.
LAws § 28-9.3-1 to -16 (2003)). In addition, the PTU alleged that the PPSD
Superintendent and PSB had: (a) refused to negotiate as required under
state law with respect to the implementation of the CBH Directive, and (b)
violated the state's Teacher Tenure Act as well as the CBA by implementing
the PPSD CBH Policy. See id. at 5-6.
19. See Mediated CBH Policy, supra note 16, at 7.
20. See id. at 12-13.
21. See Providence School Board, Resolution of August 17, 2011 (on file
with author).
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negotiated the Mediated CBH Policy, announced his resignation, 22
and collective bargaining between the PTU and the PSB broke
down due (among other things) to the parties' inability to reach
agreement with respect to the Mediated Policy.
B. The Mayor's Decision to Dismiss the Teachers and the City's
Action for Declaratory Relief
In one of his first actions after being inaugurated in January
of 2011, Mayor Angel Taveras (the "Mayor") signed an executive
order creating a Municipal Finances Review Panel to
"expeditiously review the current financial condition of all City
departments," and to report its findings to the Mayor. 23 In its
February 28, 2011 report, the Panel found that the City had a
structural deficit of fifty-seven million dollars, as well as a
fourteen million dollar operating deficit in its General Fund at the
end of fiscal year 2010, an operating deficit that was largely
attributable to cost overruns in school operations. 24
Even before the Review Panel had published its report, the
new City administration inferred that drastic measures, including
school closures and/or teacher dismissals, would likely be
necessary to deal with a financial crisis that increasingly
appeared to be of unprecedented proportions. However, the
administration was unable to make specific recommendations to
the PSB or PTU concerning necessary savings (i.e., which specific
schools would have to be closed and/or which specific teachers
dismissed) until it fully understood the depths of the financial
crisis and had, among other things, considered the specific
recommendations of the Review Panel.
Thus, absent the information necessary to make informed
decisions concerning specific school closings and teacher
22. Borg, supra note 4, at Al. Differences of opinion between the PSB
and the Superintendent relative to CBH created a challenge for attorneys
from the City's Law Department, whose "client" was the School Board, but
who by necessity took marching orders from the Superintendent. See
generally Anthony F. Cottone, Identifying the Municipal Client: Some Shelter
from the Storm, R.I. B. J., Jan.-Feb. 2011, at 11, 11.
23. See Mayor of Providence, Exec. Order No. 2011-2 Appointing a
Municipal Finances Review Panel (Jan. 11, 2011), available at
http://cityof.providenceri.com/efile/453.
24. See CITY OF PROVIDENCE, REPORT OF THE MUNICIPAL FINANCES REVIEW
PANEL 1 (2011), available at http://www.providenceri.comlefile/558.
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dismissals, it would appear that neither the PSB nor the City
administration was able to "bargain" with the PTU during
January and February of 2011. Indeed, it was this very lack of
information which led the Mayor and the PPSD Superintendent to
recommend to the PSB that it preserve all necessary financial
options by complying with a somewhat arbitrary provision in the
state Teachers' Tenure Act (the "Tenure Act"),25 which mandated
that any teacher to be dismissed be provided with written notice of
the planned dismissal by March 1 of the preceding year.2 6 The
PSB approved the recommendation on February 24, 2011 and
preliminary dismissal notices were sent to each and every one of
the City's 1934 teachers the very next day.
From the outset, the Mayor made clear that the dismissal
notices were preliminary in the sense that even in the worst of
economic circumstances, the great majority would be rescinded,
and in fact the Mayor and the PSB began bargaining with the
PTU concerning the manner by which the bulk of the teachers
would be recalled soon after the preliminary dismissal notices had
been sent. 27 Nonetheless, on February 28, 2011-the same day
25. R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 16-13-1 to -8 (2001 & Supp. 2011).
26. See id. § 16-13-3(a). The Teachers' Tenure Act provides that
Whenever a tenured teacher in continuous service is to be dismissed,
the notice of the dismissal shall be given to the teacher, in writing,
on or before March 1st of the school year immediately preceding the
school year in which the dismissal is to become effective.
Id. (emphasis added). Although several courts have held that a bona fide
economic exigency can constitute "good and just cause" for dismissal under
the Tenure Act, see infra Part II, whether the Act's March 1 notice provision
would apply in an economic emergency of this nature (i.e., when time is of the
essence) has not been decided. It should be noted, however, that RIDE has
suggested that the Act's strictures would apply. See Letter from RIDE
Commissioner Deborah A. Gist to State Senator James C. Sheehan (March 8,
2011). In addition to a March 1 deadline, the Tenure Act also mandates that:
The statement of cause for dismissal shall be given to the teacher, in
writing, by the governing body of the schools at least one month
prior to the close of the school year. The teacher may, within fifteen
(15) days of the notification, request, in writing, a hearing before the
full board. The hearing shall be public or private, in the discretion of
the teacher. Both teacher and school board shall be entitled to be
represented by counsel and to present witnesses.
R.I. GEN. LAws § 16-13-4(a). The PTU has consistently opposed amending the
Tenure Act so as to remove the artificial March 1 deadline.
27. Although the City's obligation to bargain prior to sending out the
initial dismissal notices is unclear, there would seem to be little doubt that
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that the Review Panel published its report and
recommendations-the PTU filed an unfair labor practice charge
(a "ULPC") against the School Board, claiming that the Board had
breached a duty to bargain prior to sending the dismissal
-28notices.
The PSB voted to recall almost eighty percent of the teachers
on May 2, 2011 (the "PSB Rescission and Recall Plan").29 The
City, still facing the uncertainty created by the PTU's pending
federal court action and its ULPC challenging the City's right to
dismiss any teachers, filed an action for declaratory relief in
Superior Court seeking: (1) a ruling as to the legality of the PSB's
dismissal of some teachers and its Rescission and Recall Plan; and
(2) a stay of the PTU's ULPC. 30 The PTU responded by filing: (1)
a motion to remove the case to federal court; and (2) a second
action in federal court, alleging federal due process violations and
seeking to enjoin the City from dismissing any teachers due to
fiscal exigency. 31
the School Board did have an obligation to bargain collectively with PTU
regarding the effect of the dismissal notices and the methodology of any
rescissions or recalls. See Providence Hosp. v. NLRB, 93 F.3d 1012, 1018 (1st
Cir. 1996).
28. See Complaint at 1, Providence School Board and Providence
Teachers Union, AFT Local 958, R.I. SLRB Case No. ULP-6030 (February 28,
2011) (citing R.I. GEN. LAws § 28-7-13 (6), (10) (2003)) (on file with author).
The PTU later mailed an amended charge on March 18, 2011, which added
the claim that by sending out the dismissal notices, the PSB had attempted
to interfere with the PTU's very existence. See id. (citing R.I. GEN. LAWS §
28-7-13(3) (2003)).
29. The remaining teachers were either informed of the process by which
some of them might be recalled or considered on a case-by-case basis.
30. See, Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Their First Amended
Verified Complaint and Expedited Motion to Stay Arbitration at 1, City of
Providence, et al. v. Providence Teachers Union, C.A. No. PC 11-2526 (R.I.
Super. Ct. June 17, 2011). The City argued that the CBA had expired as a
matter of law almost a year prior, on August 31, 2010. The parties' June 22,
2009 agreement purporting to extend the term of their CBA from three to
four years, to August 31, 2011 (which was approved by the City Council on or
about July 27, 2009 as part of its approval of the original CBA) was, the City
claimed, in direct contravention of Rhode Island General Laws section 28-9.3-
4, which expressly provides that "'no contract shall exceed the term of three (3)
years."' Id. at 5 (quoting R.I. GEN. LAws § 28-9.3-4 (2003)); see also E.
Providence Sch. Comm. v. E. Providence Educ. Ass'n, C.A. No. PB 09-1421,
slip. op. at 18 (R.I. Super. Ct. Mar. 15, 2010) (CBA no longer binding after
three years under Rhode Island General Laws section 28-9.3-4).
31. See Complaint, Providence Teachers Union v. Brady, C.A. No. 11-cv-
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C. Enter the General Assembly
Under these circumstances, the Mayor and/or the PTU-
having failed to convince the School Board to modify its strict "no
bumping" position and resume collective bargaining-turned to
the General Assembly for assistance. A bill sponsored by
Providence state senator Paul Jabour and others was quickly
introduced in the General Assembly in June 2011, at the very end
of the legislative session, that stripped appointed school boards
like the PSB of various powers, including the power to negotiate
and "enter into" CBAs, and transferred these powers to mayors. 32
The bill was quickly approved (without the benefit of a public
hearing) and signed into law by the Governor (the "Jabour Act"). 33
The "power and duty to" negotiate and "enter into" CBAs, a
"power and duty" which had resided with the School Board, was
thus transferred to the Mayor. 34
The School Board President responded to the hastily enacted
new law by resigning. 35 The Mayor responded by hiring his own
attorney and successfully negotiating a successor CBA with the
PTU (the "2011 CBA"), which was to be effective through August
31, 2014 and which contained significant monetary concessions by
the PTU.36 Of course, the 2011 CBA also adopted the Mediated
CBH Policy that had been expressly rejected by the School Board
and retained other provisions in the expiring CBA which the
Board indicated it had wanted to revise. 37 Significantly, the 2011
182 (D.R.I. 2011).
32. See S. 1062, 2011 Gen. Assembly, Jan. Sess. (R.I. 2011).
33. See Act of June 21, 2011, Ch. 265, § 1, 2011 R.I. Gen. Laws Adv.
Legis. Serv. (LexisNexis) (to be codified at R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 16-1-19.1, -2-9, -
7-29 (Supp. 2011). By substituting the Mayor for the PSB in all relevant
labor statutes, the legislation stripped the PSB of its power and duty to
bargain with the teachers union. See id. The measure also removed from the
PBS the power to implement certain optional plans to incentivize teacher
retirements and a minimum salary schedule for certified personnel. See id.
(amending R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 16-1-19.1 and -7-29 (Supp. 2011)).
34. See R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 16-2-9(a)(18), (c) (Supp. 2011).
35. See Borg, supra note 5, at Al. The resigning PSB President was
quoted as saying that "she could no longer stand working in a system that is
driven by politics, power and patronage, not what's best for children." Id.
36. See Linda Borg, Tentative Teachers Contract Reached, PROVIDENCE
J., August 3, 2011, at Al.
37. Members of the PSB had consistently expressed the opinion that the
teachers' contract was too long and contained too many arcane procedural
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CBA negotiated by the Mayor, which was ratified by the City
Council on September 27, 2011,38 also contained a clause that
ostensibly mandated that for the next three years, no teacher in
the City could be dismissed or laid off for reasons of "fiscal
exigency." 39
II. THE STATE'S "ESSENTIAL EDUCATIONAL MISSION" AND
requirements, which impeded meaningful reform. Of course, these
sentiments are not unique to Providence. As Brill notes, in New York City,
the first teachers' contract negotiated by Albert Shanker in 1962 was thirty-
nine pages; by 1965 it was seventy-five pages; in 1969, the contract grew to
111 pages; by 1997, it was 185 pages, and there was a teachers' manual four
times thicker; and by 2002 it was 206 pages. BRILL, supra note 9, at 35-36,
75, 89. According to some commentators:
Today's teacher collective bargaining agreements are vestiges of the
industrial economic model that prevailed in the 1950s, when
assembly-line workers and low-level managers were valued less for
their knowledge or technical skills than for their longevity and
willingness to serve loyally as a cog in a top-down enterprise. They
are a harmful anachronism in today's K-12 education system, where
effective teachers are demanding to be treated as respected
professionals and forward thinking leaders are working to transform
schools into nimble organizations focused on student learning.
FREDERICK M. HESS & MARTIN R. WEST, A BETTER BARGAIN: OVERHAULING
TEACHER COLLECTIVE BARGAINING FOR THE 21sT CENTURY 2 (2010), available
at http://www.defendcharterschools.org/ABetterBargain.pdf; see also EMILY
COHEN, KATE WALSH & RISHAWN BIDDLE, INVISIBLE INK IN COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING: WHY KEY ISSUES ARE NOT ADDRESSED (2008), available at
http://www.nctq.org/p/publications/docs/nctq_invisible ink 20080801115950.
pdf. Brill notes that it is problematic that advancement in the occupation
employing the second most people in the nation (apparently there are more
retail sales clerks than teachers) is based upon one's ability to breathe. After
Words with Steven Brill (C-SPAN2 BookTV broadcast on August 1, 2011)
(Diane Ravitch interviews Steven Brill), available at http://www.c-
spanvideo.org/program/300570-1.
38. The brand new acting PPSD Superintendent signed the tentatively
agreed-upon CBA at the Mayor's request without having obtained the
authority of the School Board. However, on September 26, 2011, the Board
adopted a resolution stating that "[tihe PSB considers the action of the PPSD
Superintendent in signing the August 3 CBA to be of no legal force or effect,
and specifically rejects the suggestion that the Superintendent's signature on
the August 3 CBA in any way binds the PSB, the PPSD, or any other party."
See Providence School Board, Resolution of September 26, 2011 (on file with
author).
39. See Agreement Between the Providence Teachers Union, AFT Local
958 and the Providence School Board, PROVIDENCE TEACHERS UNION, Art. 21
(effective Sept. 1, 2011 - Aug. 31, 2014), available at www.proteun.org/CBA-
9-1-11.pdf.
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COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
The fact that teachers perform a task which is qualitatively
different from that of many other employees who have been
afforded the right to collectively bargain explains, in part, why a
teacher's right to engage in collective bargaining was not
recognized in Rhode Island until the Michaelson Act became law
in 1966,40 some twenty years after the Rhode Island Labor
Relations Act ("RILRA") 41 had extended the right to collectively
bargain to other employees not covered by the National Labor
Relations Act (the "NLRA").42  Indeed, even after the right to
collectively bargain had been extended to teachers, its application
presented unique difficulties.
Under Rhode Island law, it is clear that "'[c]ontracts entered
into in contravention to a state statute . .. are illegal, and no
contract rights are created thereby."' 43  Thus, CBA provisions
concerning items which are a part of the "essence of the
educational mission of a school board" are not enforceable.44
Stating the rule, however, has been a lot easier than applying it,
especially considering the rather narrow view of school board
40. See R.I. GEN. LAws § 28-9.3-1 to -16 (2003). Teachers were afforded
the right to collectively bargain "concerning hours, salary, working
conditions, and all other terms and conditions of professional employment."
Id. § 28-9.3-2.
41. See R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 28-7-1 to -49 (2003 & Supp. 2011).
42. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2006). Employees exempted from the
NLRA's coverage typically were employed by businesses that were not large
enough to be deemed to affect interstate commerce.
43. See Vose v. R.I. Bhd. of Corr. Officers, 587 A.2d 913, 915 (R.I. 1991)
(quoting Power v. City of Providence, 582 A.2d 895, 900 (R.I. 1990))
(alteration in original). In Vose, the court refused to enforce a CBA provision
entered into between the Adult Correctional Institute and correctional
officers, which prohibited mandatory overtime. The Court reasoned that "the
agreement strips the director of his ability to '[m]ake and promulgate
necessary rules and regulations incidental to the exercise of his or her powers
[to provide for] . . . safety, discipline . . . care, and custody for all persons
committed to correctional facilities."' Id. at 915 (alteration in original).
44. See, e.g., Woonsocket Teachers' Guild v. Woonsocket Sch. Comm.,
770 A.2d 834, 838 (R.I. 2001) (school committee's duty to provide health
services to students was non-delegable and thus committee had authority to a
compel school nurse to dispense medication despite collective bargaining
agreement language to the contrary); Pawtucket Sch. Comm. v. Pawtucket
Teachers' Alliance, 652 A.2d 970, 972 (R.I. 1995) (upholding the right of the
Pawtucket School Committee to require English as a Second Language
Program teachers to submit lesson plans in derogation of a CBA).
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management rights that has on occasion been adopted by the
Rhode Island Supreme Court
For example, in Belanger v. Matteson, a faculty hiring
committee, superintendent and school committee all approved the
promotion of a teacher to the position of Business Department
Head at Warwick Veterans Memorial High School.45 Matteson, an
unsuccessful candidate for the position who had more seniority,
filed a grievance alleging that awarding the promotion to a less
senior teacher violated the applicable CBA. After Belanger had
been on the job for a year, a panel of arbitrators agreed with
Matteson. 46 Belanger than grieved his demotion, arguing that the
arbitrators had exceeded their authority as the hiring decision
was within the management rights of the school committee and
not a proper subject for a CBA. In the subsequent litigation, the
Superior Court agreed with Belanger and vacated the arbitration
award.47 However, the Rhode Island Supreme Court reversed,
holding that "the Warwick School Committee was well within its
power when it agreed that its promotions of teachers could be
subject to review by the arbitrators through the use of the
grievance mechanism set forth in the [CBA]."48 The Belanger
Court noted that:
The legislative mandate for good-faith bargaining is
broad and unqualified and we will not limit its thrust in
the absence of an explicit statutory provision which
specifically bars a school committee from making an
agreement as to a particular term or condition of
employment. When § 16-2-18 and the School Teachers'
Arbitration Act are placed in their respective time
frames, it is obvious that the tightfisted grip which a
school committee in 1903 might have held over the day-
to-day operations of its schools has been relaxed
somewhat when, at its January 1966 session, the
Legislature directed such committees to act as
responsible public employers; otherwise the goal of
affording the advantage of collective bargaining
45. 346 A.2d 124, 127 (R.I. 1975).
46. Id. at 128.
47. Id. at 128-29.
48. Id. at 137.
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procedures to this particular group of public employees
could never be realized.49
Three years later, the New Jersey Supreme Court expressed
the flip side of Belanger in Ridgefield Park Education Association
v. Ridgefield Park Board of Education,50 where the court noted
that:
[P]ublic employees' special access to government applies
only where the government is acting in the capacity of an
employer, and not where it is acting in its capacity as
public policymaker. A private employer may bargain
away as much or as little of its managerial control as it
likes .... However, the very foundation of representative
democracy would be endangered if decisions on
significant matters of governmental policy were left to the
process of collective negotiation, where citizen
participation is precluded. This Court would be most
reluctant to sanction collective agreement on matters
which are essentially managerial in nature, because the
true managers are the people. Our democratic system
demands that governmental bodies retain their
49. Id. at 136-37 (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted); see also
Barrington Sch. Comm. v. R.I. State Labor Relations Bd., 388 A.2d 1369,
1373-75 (R.I. 1978). In Barrington, the Court, while giving lip service to the
basic principle that certain matters of education policy were not subject to
collective bargaining, nonetheless upheld the SLRB's conclusion that the
school committee had a duty to bargain with the union before unilaterally
eliminating eleven departmental chairmanships and abolishing the position
of athletic director. Id. at 1375. The Court noted that:
While we postulate no general rule, in the circumstance here we
conclude that the abolition of the 12 department chairmanships is
not completely a matter of educational policy but is an appropriate
matter for negotiating or bargaining concerning the effect on the
individual teachers involved. In addition, to require the committee
to bargain about the matter at issue would not in our opinion
significantly abridge its freedom to manage and control the school
system. We do not mean that the union should be able to dictate to
the committee on matters strictly within the province of
management. What we do say is that when, as here, the problem
involved concerns both a question of management and a term or
condition of employment, it is the duty of the committee to negotiate
with the teachers involved.
Id.
50. 393 A.2d 278 (N.J. 1978).
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accountability to the citizenry.51
More recently, the Rhode Island Supreme Court has at least
suggested that it may be willing to modify the narrow concept of
non-delegable school board management rights it articulated in
Belanger. For example, in North Providence School Committee v.
North Providence Federation of Teachers,52 the Court considered a
school committee's challenge to an arbitrator's award in a dispute
involving the need to provide English teachers with "composition
periods."53  Although the Court eventually concluded that the
issue was in fact arbitrable and affirmed the arbitrator's decision
in favor of the union, 54 it also affirmed the "basic rule of law that
school committees are not at liberty to bargain away their powers
and responsibilities with respect to the essence of the educational
mission."5 5  The North Providence Court noted that it was
"figuratively standing on the banks of the Rubicon," and that "a
very strong argument can be made that a decision about having or
not having a composition period for teachers of English is directly
related to the essence of the educational mission and is therefore
non-arbitrable." 56
Significantly, the North Providence Court based its holding
upon the fact that the school committee had "opted to ground the
abolition of the composition period primarily on a fiscal
51. Id. at 287; see also Bd. of Directors of Me. Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 36
v. Me. Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 36 Teachers Ass'n, 428 A.2d 419, 422 (Me. 1981)
(school board cannot lawfully delegate its statutory responsibility for
choosing teachers in a CBA); Sch. Comm. of Holbrook v. Holbrook Educ.
Ass'n, 481 N.E.2d 484, 488 (Mass. 1985) (holding that an arbitrator
impermissibly usurped the powers and responsibilities granted to the
superintendent and school committee when ordering the school district to
recall a more senior teacher to the position of school counselor); Sch. Comm.
of Springfield v. Springfield Adm'rs' Ass'n, 628 N.E.2d 33, 34 (Mass. App. Ct.
1994) ("[A] school committee may not be relieved of-indeed it may not
bargain away-its statutory responsibility . . . to appoint teachers and
managers of teachers, such as a principal.").
52. 945 A.2d 339 (R.I. 2008).
53. See id. at 341.
54. Id. at 347.
55. Id. The Court added that, "[ilt goes without saying that statutory
duties that are specifically imposed upon school committees by law (and
activities closely associated therewith) may not be made the subject of the
arbitral process." Id. at 346 n.12.
56. Id. at 347.
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rationale."57  Perhaps as significantly, in a seeming departure
from the requirement in Belanger that any abrogation of duties
imposed by the law of collective bargaining be supported by "an
explicit statutory provision which specifically bars a school
committee from making an agreement as to a particular term or
condition of employment,"58 the Court has also noted (albeit in
dicta) that "[e]ven in the absence of... specific statutory
mandates . . . school committees are vested with a plethora of
powers and responsibilities that relate to the essence of the
educational mission that may not be bargained away."59
Of course, the notion that there is an undefined area of school
board management rights which cannot be bargained away has
never been enthusiastically embraced by teachers unions, which
have a vested interest in opposing certain types of education
reform that necessarily thin the ranks of their members. 60
Although the state's preemption of the field of education suggests
57. Id. Indeed, the court's consistent use of the term "essence" when
distinguishing matters that are within a school board's "educational mission"
at least suggests that there is some relevant distinction between essential
and non-essential matters relating to educational policy. However, no such
distinction is reflected in the statute, which confers jurisdiction over
educational policy upon school committees. See R.I. GEN. LAws § 16-2-9(a)(2),
(6), (14), (19), (20) (Supp. 2011).
58. Belanger v. Matteson, 346 A.2d 124, 136-37 (R.I. 1975).
59. N. Providence Sch. Comm., 945 A.2d at 346 n.12.
60. As early as 1969, in an official statement given to the Advisory
Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, as quoted in National
Education Association of Shawnee Mission v. Board of Education, 512 P.2d
426, 434 (Kan. 1973), the National Education Association ("NEA") declared
that:
It is our position that private sector definitions are unduly restrictive
when applied to teacher-school board negotiation. We believe that a
teacher, having committed himself to a career of socially valuable
service and having invested years in preparation . . . has a special
identification with the standards of his "practice" and the quality of
the service provided to his "clientele." As a result of this
identification, teachers characteristically seek to participate in
decision-making in respect to teaching methods, curriculum content,
educational facilities and other matters designed to change the
nature or improve the quality of the educational service being given
to the children, and they see negotiation as the vehicle for such
participation. Accordingly, we propose that a broad and somewhat
open-ended definition of scope of negotiation be adopted . .. [namely
in regard to] ". . . matters of mutual concern."
Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
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that RIDE should be afforded wide latitude by the courts when
defining management rights, 61 it often is difficult to determine
whether any given CBA provision constitutes a violation of the
BEP in the absence of a specific implementing order or decision,
which, somewhat understandably, RIDE has been reluctant to
provide. And teachers unions are well aware that often the most
effective way to prevent a district from implementing a reform is
to effectively prohibit the reform in obscure CBA language, and
then characterize its attempted implementation as an unfair labor
practice and bog down the often cash-strapped and under-
performing urban school district in the seemingly endless
mediation and arbitration processes that characterize dispute
resolution in the labor field.
In Portsmouth School Committee, the Committee asked RIDE
for an opinion as to the legality of its newly-adopted CBH policy
("Policy 4111"), which empowered the Superintendent and
Committee to select and appoint school department personnel
without significant input from the teachers union, and without
reference to the strict seniority provisions in the applicable CBA.62
The union had filed a ULPC alleging that the Committee had
failed to bargain prior to implementing the new policy. 63 When it
did not receive a response from RIDE, the School Committee filed
a complaint in Superior Court seeking an injunction to prevent
the SLRB from deciding the ULPC on the ground that the charge
61. For example, RIDE insists that CBA provisions that conflict with the
BEP or with RIDE orders or directives interpreting the BEP are
unenforceable as a matter of law. As noted by RIDE Commissioner Gist
following recent amendments to the BEP:
On July 1, 2010, the BEP will become law in the state of Rhode
Island. As such, the requirements of the BEP will effectively be read
into every collective-bargaining agreement entered into after that
date. Contract language cannot conflict with existing state law,
including regulations, and contract language that conflicts with
existing law may be unenforceable.
See Memorandum from RIDE Commissioner Deborah A. Gist to her
colleagues regarding Basic Education Regulations and Seniority-Based
Teacher Assignments (Oct. 20, 2009), available at http://www.ride.ri.gov/
Commissioner/news/advisories/2009/bep%20regulations%20and%20senority-
based%20teacher%20assignments.pdf.
62. Portsmouth Sch. Comm. v. NEA Portsmouth, C.A. No. PC 11-3239,
slip op. at 2 (R.I. Super. Nov. 7, 2011), available at http://www.courts.ri.gov/
Courts/SuperiorCourt/DecisionsOrders/decisions/11-3239.pdf.
63. Id.
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required the SLRB to act outside its jurisdiction and "determine
the scope of the School Committee's authority under Title 16."64
Although the court in Portsmouth School Committee
recognized that "there exists a substantial gray area between the
black of educational policy, and the white of bargainable
employment issues,"65 it was not a gray area into which the court
wanted to venture. Instead, relying upon the narrow formulation
of management rights in Belanger, the court granted the union's
motion to dismiss, holding that "[t]he term 'educational policy' is
not a talisman for the avoidance of the obligation to collectively
bargain,"66 and "declin[ing] the School Committee's invitation to
declare, as a matter of law, that the authority granted to the
School Committee by law in educational policy matters brings the
adoption of Policy 4111 outside the category of mandatory subjects
of collective bargaining." 67
The outcome in Portsmouth School Committee, which has
been appealed, was in certain respects a function of RIDE's refusal
to exercise its jurisdiction under Title 16. After all, the court
made clear that it "value [d] an agency's specialized understanding
of a particular area of the law,"68 a comment which could be read
as pertaining to RIDE's refusal to exercise jurisdiction as well as
to SLRB's labor law expertise.
Interestingly, the decision in Portsmouth School Committee is
at odds with an advisory opinion issued by RIDE's Commissioner
at the request of the Lincoln School Committee, which had
adopted a professional and support hiring policy after its CBA had
expired and it was unable to reach agreement with the teachers
union. 69 In the Lincoln Advisory Opinion, which was issued the
very same day as the Superior Court's decision in Portsmouth
School Committee, Commissioner Gist noted that school
committees should "develop, implement and monitor" policies and
procedures for "recruitment, hiring and retention of school
64. Id. at 3.
65. Id. at 10.
66. Id. at 9.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 7.
69. See Formal Legal Advisory Opinion from RIDE Commissioner
Deborah A. Gist at the Request of Lincoln School Committee (Nov. 7, 2011),
available at http://www.ride.ri.gov/Commissioner/news/advisories/default.
aspx (the "Lincoln Advisory Opinion").
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staff ... independently of the collective bargaining process," 70 and
concluded that "staffing decisions relating to providers of
instructional services are vested in the non-delegable managerial
responsibilities of the school district."7 1
The analysis is perhaps simpler when a specific statutory
mandate, such as the requirement that school boards and
committees maintain a balanced budget, is involved.72 For
example, in a recent case involving East Providence, which also is
on appeal as of this writing, the school committee made certain
unilateral changes to the salary and benefits of teachers after the
applicable three-year CBA had expired.73 The union immediately
filed a ULPC with the SLRB alleging that the school committee
had failed to bargain in good faith, and argued that in any event,
the committee did not have the authority to unilaterally alter
provisions in the CBA following impasse. 74 In response, the school
committee filed a declaratory judgment action in Superior Court
seeking a declaration that its actions had been dictated by the
statutory imperative that it balance its budget.7 5
The Superior Court, while leaving it to the SLRB to decide
whether the school committee had bargained in good faith
following the expiration of the CBA, found that the committee was
in fact facing an actual budget deficit 76 and held that: (1) "a
determination of what actions are lawful and possibly even
required under § 16-2-9(d) falls outside the jurisdiction to
determine unfair labor practices afforded to the SLRB under
Chapter 28";77 and (2) the school committee had acted lawfully in
70. Id. at 2-3.
71. Id. at 7.
72. See R.I. GEN. LAws § 16-2-9(d) (2001) ("The school committee of each
school district shall be responsible for maintaining a school budget which
does not result in a debt."); see also Sch. Comm. of Cranston v. Bergin-
Andrews, 984 A.2d 629, 644 (R.I. 2009) ("[I]t is clear that the General
Assembly intended school committees to amend their budgets, request
waivers, and request additional appropriations from their host municipalities
at the first indication of a possible or actual deficit.").
73. E. Providence Sch. Comm. v. E. Providence Educ. Ass'n, No. PB/09-
1421, slip. op. at 3 (R.I. Super. Ct. Mar. 15, 2010), available at http://
www.courts.ri.gov/Courts/SuperiorCourt/DecisionsOrders/09- 1 4 2 1 .pdf.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 3, 4-5.
76. See id. at 16.
77. Id. at 18.
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unilaterally changing the terms and conditions of the teachers'
employment after the CBA had expired.
As to the state of affairs in Providence, it would appear that
dicta in East Providence and North Providence would support the
notion that the clause in Providence's 2011 CBA prohibiting
teacher dismissals and layoffs actuated by fiscal exigency would
be held to be unenforceable in most situations, if not facially
invalid. After all, the facts surrounding most actions attempting
to enforce the clause likely would involve the same statutory and
similar charter prohibitions against school budget deficits
implicated in East Providence. Moreover, if the Rhode Island
Supreme Court felt in North Providence that it was "figuratively
standing on the banks of the Rubicon" when faced with the loss of
a composition period for English teachers, 79 it is hard to see how it
would not feel that the Rubicon had been crossed were it to uphold
a clause with a blanket prohibition on a school board dismissing or
laying off any teachers for any reason related to "fiscal exigency,"
especially since it appears that "fiscal exigency" constitutes a
"good and just cause" for the outright dismissal of a tenured
teacher under the Tenure Act.8 0
78. Id. at 17-18. However, it is important to note that in East
Providence, the unilateral changes made by the school committee were made
only after the parties had engaged in the mediation and arbitration
procedures mandated by Title 28, and by their very nature necessarily
involved the expenditure of money, thus falling outside an arbitrator's
enforcement jurisdiction under statutorily- mandated impasse procedures.
See id. at 14, 17-18. Cf. Local 732 of the Int'l. Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of
Woonsocket, No. 09-947, 2009 R.I. Super. LEXIS 161, at *45 (R.I. Super. Ct.
Mar. 4, 2009) (denying a union's motion for an injunction to prevent layoffs
and unilateral salary and benefit reductions during a fiscal crisis).
79. See N. Providence Sch. Comm. v. N. Providence Fed'n of Teachers,
945 A.2d 339, 347 (R.I. 2008).
80. See Clifford v. Board of Regents, No. PC 83-4787, 1987 WL 859783,
at *4 (R.I. Super. Ct. Aug. 20, 1987) (bona fide financial exigency constitutes
good and just cause under the Tenure Act); Stiefer v. New Shoreham Sch.
Comm., No. C.A. 78-843, 1980 WL 336047, at *6 (R.I. Super. Ct. Feb. 21,
1980) ("[E]conomic conditions would be a 'good and just cause' even for a
tenured teacher's contract to be terminated."). It also seems unlikely that
the clause would be held applicable to dismissals of teachers pursuant to a
RIDE mandated and approved intervention model at designated persistently
low-achieving schools, since, as will be discussed, neither RIDE's designation
of a PLA School, nor any resulting teacher displacement, would be premised
upon "fiscal exigency," but would likely be held to have been for other "good
and just cause" under the Tenure Act. See infra Part III.B.
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In East Providence, the Superior Court also held that the
expired CBA "was no longer binding,"81 citing Litton Financial
Printing Division v. NLRB.82 In Litton, the United States
Supreme Court set forth and approved the unilateral change
doctrine, which has been recognized in dicta by the Rhode Island
Supreme Court. 83  In essence, the doctrine provides that an
employer can make a unilateral change to an existing term or
condition of employment spelled out in an expired CBA, as long as
the employer has first bargained to impasse. 84 Of course, Litton
did not involve the public sector and must be read against the
backdrop of statutory impasse procedures binding school boards in
Rhode Island, which, somewhat counter-intuitively, results in an
arbitration process that is only enforceable as to non-economic
items.
81. E. Providence Sch. Comm., No. PB/09-1421, slip op. at 15.
82. 501 U.S. 190, 206 (1991).
83. See Providence Teachers Union v. Providence Sch. Bd., 689 A.2d 388,
393 n.2 (R.I. 1997).
84. See Litton, 501 U.S. at 199.
85. R.I. GEN. LAws § 28-9.3-9(c)-(d) (2003). This statute provides that
(c) In the event that the negotiating or bargaining agent and the
school committee are unable within ten (10) days of the scheduled
close of school in June of the last year of the contract in effect to
reach an agreement on a contract, any and all unresolved issues
shall be submitted to the director of labor and training for
compulsory mediation.... [and]
(d) If the parties cannot mutually agree upon a mediator within
twenty- four (24) hours, the director of labor and training shall select
a mediator from a panel previously established by the director
comprised of persons knowledgeable in the field of labor
management relations to mediate the dispute. The department of
labor and training is empowered to compel the attendance of all the
parties to any and all meetings it deems necessary until the dispute
is resolved.
Read literally, section 28-9.3-9(d) would seem to empower the SLRB to
compel mediation indefinitely, but such a reading would render the
arbitration provisions superfluous. If mediation fails, either party may
request arbitration before a three-arbitrator panel, with each side selecting
an arbitrator and with the third (neutral) selected by the other two. See id. §
28-9.3-10. The arbitrators are required to hold a preliminary hearing within
ten (10) days after their appointment. See id. § 28-9.3-11(a). The final
hearing "shall be concluded within twenty (20) days of the time of
commencement, and within ten (10) days after the conclusion of the hearings,
the arbitrators shall make written findings and a written opinion upon the
issues presented. ... " Id. § 28-9.3-11(d). Finally,
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In East Providence, however, the court did not have to
determine whether there even was a duty to bargain following the
CBA's expiration, although imposing such a duty would seem
problematic with respect to terms that were statutorily mandated
or otherwise outside the realm of collective bargaining. In any
event, it is clear under Rhode Island law that a failure to bargain
claim must be premised upon a refusal to bargain, and therefore a
timely request for bargaining is a condition precedent to
liability. 86 What is less clear is what specific items constitute
mandatory, permissive, or prohibited items of collective
bargaining, especially in the context of public education.
The decision of the arbitrators shall be made public and shall be
binding on the certified public school teachers and their
representative and the school committee on all matters not involving
the expenditure of money; provided, that nothing contained in this
section shall prevent the representative of the certified public school
teachers and the school committee from mutually agreeing to submit
all unresolved issues to binding arbitration pursuant to the
procedures set forth in §§ 28-9.3-10-28-9.3-12.
Id. § 28-9.3-12 (emphasis added).
86. Id. § 28-9.3-4 ("It shall be the obligation of the school committee to
meet and confer in good faith with the representative or representatives of
the negotiating or bargaining agent within ten (10) days after receipt of
written notice from the agent of the request for a meeting for negotiating or
collective bargaining purposes. This obligation includes the duty to cause any
agreement resulting from negotiation or bargaining to be reduced to a
written contract; provided, that no contract shall exceed the term of three (3)
years. An unfair labor practice charge may be complained of by either the
bargaining agent or the school committee to the state labor relations board
which shall deal with the complaint in the manner provided in chapter 7 of
this title") (emphasis added); see also id. § 28-7-13.1 (premising liability upon
a refusal to bargain). For example, in Town of Burrillville v. Rhode Island
State Labor Relations Board, the chief of police promulgated a general order
containing several procedural changes to the process by which police officers
applied for injured-on-duty benefits. 921 A.2d 113, 116-17 (R.I. 2007). The
chief met with the union president and showed him the proposed general
order one week prior to its implementation. Id. at 116. The union president
claimed that he had made no request to bargain because he had assumed
that the parties would have additional discussions prior to implementation,
and filed an ULPC. See id. at 116-17. In reversing the SLRB's finding that
the town had committed an unfair labor practice by failing to bargain with
the union prior to implementing the general order, Justice Robinson noted
that "[a] union must do more than merely protest the proposed change or file
an unfair labor practice action in order to preserve its right to bargain; a
union must affirmatively advise the employer of its desire to engage in
bargaining." Id. at 120.
87. See, e.g., Barrington Sch. Comm. v. R.I. State Labor Relations Bd.,
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The Rhode Island Supreme Court frequently has looked to the
federal courts for guidance in the area of labor law,8 8 and two
United States Supreme Court cases-First National Maintenance
Corp. v. NLRB89 and Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v.
NLRB 90-are occasionally cited by Rhode Island litigants arguing
over whether an item is suitable for collective bargaining. In First
National Maintenance Corp., the employer, First National
Maintenance Corp. ("FNM"), was unable to agree on the terms for
the renewal of a maintenance contract with a third party,
Greenpark Care Center.9 1  As a result, FNM's unionized
employees who had been working at Greenpark were summarily
discharged. 92 The union filed a ULPC against FNM under the
NLRA alleging that it had breached its duty to negotiate with the
union before discharging the employees.93  The First National
Maintenance Corp. Court noted that although
Congress did not explicitly state what issues of mutual
concern to union and management it intended to exclude
from mandatory bargaining ... [n]onetheless, in view of
an employer's need for unencumbered decisionmaking,
bargaining over management decisions that have a
substantial impact on the continued availability of
388 A.2d 1369 (R.I. 1978). Recent legislative efforts to curtail the bargaining
rights of public sector labor unions in other states have varied. Some have
been limited to purely economic items, such as employee contributions to
health care and cost-of-living adjustments. See, e.g., N.J. S. No. 2937,
Assembly No. 4133, 214th Leg. (N.J. 2011); Assembly Bill 11, 2011-2012 Leg.,
Jan. 2011 Spec. Sess. (Wis. 2011). Others have been broader in scope. See
Amend. Sub. S. Bill No. 5, 129th Gen. Assembly (Ohio 2011) (allowing
management to refuse to negotiate on items such as employee qualifications
and work assignments, the number of workers to be employed or on duty, and
the use of certain safety equipment).
88. As the Rhode Island Supreme Court noted, "[iun the past, in view of
the parallels between our state system of labor regulations and the federal
system, we have recognized the persuasive force of federal cases which have
construed the phrase 'terms and conditions of employment."' Barrington
School Comm., 388 A.2d at 1374-75 (citing Narragansett v. Int'l Ass'n of Fire
Fighters, Local 1589, 380 A.2d 521 (R.I. 1977); E. Providence v. Local 850,
Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters, 366 A.2d 1151 (R.I. 1976); Belanger v. Matteson,
346 A.2d 124 (R.I. 1975)).
89. 452 U.S. 666 (1981).
90. 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
91. 452 U.S. at 668-69.
92. Id. at 669.
93. Id. at 675-77.
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employment should be required only if the benefit, for
labor-management relations and the collective-bargaining
process, outweighs the burden placed on the conduct of
the business. 94
First National Maintenance Corp. can be contrasted with
Fibreboard in which the court held that a manufacturer-employer
was required to bargain with its unionized employees before
contracting out its maintenance operation. 95
The problem with analogizing these federal cases involving
the private sector to local cases involving public education (and it
is a serious problem) is that the policy objectives counterbalancing
the goals of the applicable labor law in these federal cases, (i.e.,
economic profitability, or more broadly, the efficient functioning of
free markets in the private sector) bear slight resemblance to the
"essential educational mission" of local school boards. In short,
courts faced with the task of defining the contours of collective
bargaining by separating items that are part of the "essential
94. Id. at 679 (footnote omitted); see also Pan Am. Grain Co. v. NLRB,
558 F.3d 22, 26-27 (1st Cir. 2009) (applying the First National Maintenance
Corp. balancing test); Keystone Steel & Wire v. NLRB, 606 F.2d 171, 178 (7th
Cir. 1979) (determinations made on a case-by-case basis and hinge upon
whether the subject matter will have a "material or significant effect or
impact upon a term or condition of employment"). As the First Circuit noted
in Pan American Grain:
Evaluating the scope of mandatory subjects of bargaining, the
Supreme Court identified three categories of management decisions
in First National Maintenance Corp. Decisions that affect the
employment relationship only tangentially, such as advertising and
product design, are not mandatory subjects of bargaining. Decisions
directly affecting the relationship-wages, working conditions, and
the like-are mandatory subjects of bargaining. This requirement
ensures that when an employer aims to reduce labor costs,
employees are presented with the opportunity to negotiate
concessions that reduce overall costs and thus spare jobs.
Pan Am. Grain, 558 F.2d at 26-27 (citations omitted).
95. Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp. 379 U.S. at 209. Despite the breadth
of some of the language in Fibreboard, "[c]ourts have consistently refused to
extend the duty to bargain recognized in Fibreboard to analogous
management decisions which are more central to management's autonomous
control over the direction of the business' operations." Int'l Ass'n of
Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Ne. Airlines, Inc., 473 F.2d 549, 556 (1st
Cir. 1972). In Northeast Airlines, the First Circuit suggested that it would not
apply a duty to bargain in the context of a merger or the sale of a business.
Id. at 557.
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educational mission" of a school board from those which are
"mandatory" or "permissive" "terms and conditions of professional
employment" 96 should be wary of mechanically applying law
created in private sector cases where employers have not been
tasked with educating children.
III. THE DIVISION OF POWER OVER EDUCATION POLICY
Rhode Island law pertaining to the control and management
of its public schools can be described as Madisonian, at least with
respect to the manner by which power is divided. The Rhode
Island Constitution, while expressly recognizing the right of cities
and towns to home rule,97 also expressly provides that "it shall be
the duty of the general assembly to promote public schools .. . and
to adopt all means which it may deem necessary and proper to
secure to the people the advantages and opportunities of
education." 98
Pursuant to this constitutional grant of authority, the General
Assembly in 1983 directed the Board of Regents to "adopt
regulations for determining the basic education program and the
maintenance of local appropriation to support the basic education
program" in the state. 99 Thus, the Board of Regents promulgated
the BEP, which expressly provides that each local education
agency ("LEA")' 00 "shall ensure that its schools are compliant with
the BEP, as well as with all other requirements related to student
achievement as measured by state and local assessments."101 Yet,
while affording the Board of Regents sweeping power over
education policy, the Rhode Island Legislature simultaneously
vested the "entire care, control, and management of all public
school interests of the several cities and towns . . . in the school
96. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-9.3-2 (2003).
97. R.I. CONST. art. XIII, § 1.
98. Id. art. XII, § 1.
99. See Sch. Comm. of Johnston v. Santilli, No. Civ.A. 04-6801, 2005 WL
1023070, at *2 n.4 (R.I. Super. Ct. Apr. 27, 2005) (citing R.I. GEN. LAWS § 16-
7-24) appeal dismissed as moot 912 A.2d 941 (R.I. 2007).
100. The BEP's definition of LEA is broad enough to include both the PSB
and the PPSD. See R.I. DEPT. OF ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUC., BASIC
EDUCATION PROGRAM REGULATIONS 44 (2009). The BEP encompasses
hundreds of pages of regulations covering everything from minimum
classroom hours to nutrition.
101. Id. at 6.
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committees of the several cities and towns."1 02
A. School Boards and State Preemption
In Providence, the school board--one of two appointed (as
opposed to elected) school boards in the state-has nine members,
all of whom are appointed by the Mayor.103 The Board has broad
power over education policy and procedure, a function of both
state statute as well as the City Charter.104 However, as noted,
102. R.I. GEN. LAws § 16-2-9(a) (Supp. 2011). These broad powers are
often reflected in various Home Rule Charters. For example, under the
Providence Charter, the PSB is empowered:
(a) To determine and control all policies affecting the administration,
maintenance and operation of the public schools;
(b) To provide rules and regulations for the use, operation and
maintenance of public school properties;
(c) To appoint a superintendent of schools to serve as the chief
administrative agent of the school board;
(d) To establish the compensation for said superintendent; [and]
(e) To appoint and remove all school department employees and fix
their salaries within limits established by appropriation of the city
council for the school department.
PROVIDENCE HOME RULE CHARTER, supra note 1, § 706.
103. See id. § 701.
104. R.I. GEN. LAws § 16-2-9 (2001 & Supp. 2011), entitled "General
powers and duties of school committees," provides, in pertinent part, that
"[tlhe entire care, control, and management of all public school interests of
the several cities and towns shall be vested in the school committees of the
several cities and towns." Id. § 16-2-9(a). The statute also expressly
empowers the Board:
(1) To identify educational needs in the community.
(2) To develop education policies to meet the needs of the community.
(3) To provide for and assure the implementation of federal and state
laws, the regulations of the board of regents for elementary and
secondary education, and of local school policies, programs, and
directives.
(4) To provide for the evaluation of the performance of the school
system.
(5) To have responsibility for the care and control of local schools.
(6) To have overall policy responsibility for the employment and
discipline of school department personnel.
(7) To approve a master plan defining goals and objectives of the
school system. These goals and objectives shall be expressed in terms
of what men and women should know and be able to do as a result of
their educational experience. The committee shall periodically
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evaluate the efforts and results of education in light of these
objectives.
(8) To provide for the location, care, control, and management of
school facilities and equipment.
(9) To adopt a school budget to submit to the local appropriating
authority.
(10) To adopt any changes in the school budget during the course of
the school year.
(11) To approve expenditures in the absence of a budget, consistent
with state law.
(12) To employ a superintendent of schools and assign any
compensation and other terms and conditions as the school
committee and superintendent shall agree, provided that in no event
shall the term of employment of the superintendent exceed three (3)
years. Nothing contained in this chapter shall be construed as
invalidating or impairing a contract of a school committee with a
school superintendent in force on May 12, 1978.
(13) To give advice and consent on the appointment by the
superintendent of all school department personnel.
(14) To establish minimum standards for personnel, to adopt
personnel policies, and to approve a table of organization.
(15) To establish standards for the evaluation of personnel.
(16) To establish standards for conduct in the schools and for
disciplinary actions.
(17) To hear appeals from disciplinary actions.
(18) To enter into contracts; provided, however, that
notwithstanding any other provision of the general or public laws,
whether of specific or general application, and notwithstanding the
provisions of any charter of any municipality where the school
committee is appointed and not elected, but not including, the
Central Falls school district board of trustees established by § 16-2-
34, the power and duty to enter into collective bargaining
agreements shall be vested in the chief executive officer of the
municipality and not in the school committee.
(19) To publish policy manuals which shall include all school
committee policies.
(20) To establish policies governing curriculum, courses of
instruction, and text books.
(21) To provide for transportation services which meet or exceed
standards of the board of regents for elementary and secondary
education.
(22) To make any reports to the department of education as are
required by the board of regents for elementary and secondary
education.
(23) To delegate, consistent with law, any responsibilities to the
superintendent as the committee may deem appropriate.
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local school boards like the PSB must comply with the BEP,105
and state control over education policy is not limited to the BEP.
Over a decade ago, the Board of Regents, collaborating with
teachers, parents, community agencies, administrators and policy
makers throughout the state, developed a "comprehensive
education strategy" (the "CES"). Aspects of the CES, including a
system for "school accountability for learning and teaching"
("SALT"'), were then enacted into law in 1997.106 In 2002, Rhode
Island implemented the New England Common Assessment
Program (the "NECAP") to determine which schools and districts
within the state were falling behind so-called adequate yearly
progress ("AYP") standards under the federal No Child Left
Behind Act of 2001 ("NCLB").1 0 7
The City of Providence, which is the largest school district in
Rhode Island,10 8 was included on the list of school districts with
schools not passing AYP and/or "identified for corrective action,"
(24) To address the health and wellness of students and employees.
(25) To establish a subcommittee of the school board or committee to
decrease obesity and address school health and wellness policies for
students and employees consistent with § 16-21-28.
(26) To annually undertake a minimum of six (6) hours of
professional development as set forth and described in § 16-2-5.1.
Id.; see also id. § 16-2-9(d). Moreover, section 16-2-18 states that "the
selection and appointment of teachers and other school department personnel
shall be made by the superintendent with the consent of the school
committee." Significantly, however, section 16-2-9(b) provides that "[n]othing
in this section shall be deemed to limit or interfere with the rights of teachers
and other school employees to collectively bargain pursuant to chapters 9.3
and 9.4 of title 28."
105. See Memorandum from RIDE Comm'r Gist, supra note 69, at 2.
106. See An Act Making Appropriations for the Support of the State of the
Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1998, Pub. L. No. 1997, ch. 30, art. 31, sec. 1-3
(codified at R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 16-7.1-1 to -19) (colloquially referred to as
"Article 31").
107. No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat.
1425 (2002) (codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 6301-7941).
108. In 2009, there were a total of forty-five schools, four annexes, one
center, and two charter schools under the jurisdiction of the PPSD, which
were attended by approximately 23,000 students, over seven percent of whom
were bilingual. Providence Schools at a Glance, PROVIDENCE PUB. SCH. 1
(2008-2009), available at www.providenceschools.org/media/50994/ppsd%
20fact%20sheet_0910%20(engspa).pdf. As of 2011, the PPSD employed some
1934 teachers, all of whom were members of the PTU, which is the exclusive
bargaining representative of the teachers.
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from nearly the inception of the NECAP (along with the cities of
Central Falls, Woonsocket, and Pawtucket).109 Thus, for the past
several years, the PPSD has contractually agreed to implement a
so-called "District Corrective Action Plan" providing specific
measures designed to "increas[e] student achievement," "build[]
capacity through an infrastructure of support," and "strengthen[]
parent and community engagement."" 0
RIDE has been statutorily empowered by the General
Assembly to "carry out the policies and program formulated by the
board of regents,"II and to adopt a series of progressive support
and intervention strategies consistent with CES and SALT, and
RIDE was given very specific powers-including the complete
reconstitution of a school-in the event that a school was not
improving as required.112 Thus, in addition to issuing the CBH
Directive in 2009, RIDE continued to supervise the reconstitution
of Hope High School in Providence. RIDE also adopted a protocol
for intervention in schools designated as "persistently lowest-
achieving" and "in need of improvement, corrective action, or
restructuring" (the "PLA Protocol," and "PLA Schools,"
respectively), and using federal guidelines, identified four (4)
possible intervention models: the "Turnaround," "Restart," "School
Closure," and "Transformation" Models.1 13 Significantly, RIDE's
109. Appendix B: Rhode Island List of Persistently Lowest-Achieving
Schools, R.I. DEPT. OF ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUc., http://www.ride.ri.
gov/commissioner/edpolicy/Documents/20110411_FY10_PLA_list_v1_JM.pf
(last visited Mar. 11, 2012).
110. PROVIDENCE SCHOOL DIsTRIcT CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN, 2007-2008
ACADEMIC YEAR, PROVIDENCE PUB. SCH. 2 (2007) (PPSD's negotiated
agreement with RIDE).
111. R.I. GEN. LAwS § 16-1-5 (Supp. 2011).
112. See id. § 16-7.1-5 (Supp. 2011). In addition, RIDE and the Board of
Regents share appellate jurisdiction over actions of local school boards,
including the dismissal of tenured teachers. Under the state's Tenure Act,
appeals from school board or committee actions dismissing teachers are
decided first by RIDE, and then if appealed, by the Board of Regents, and
then only if necessary, by the Superior Court. See id. § 16-13-4 (Supp. 2011).
By contrast, any party aggrieved by an action of a school board or committee
can appeal to RIDE, then to the Board of Regents, and then can file a petition
for certiorari to the Supreme Court. See id. § 16-39-1 to -4 (2001 & Supp.
2011).
113. See COMM'R DEBORAH A. GIsT, R.I. DEPT. OF ELEMENTARY AND
SECONDARY EDUC., PROTOCOL FOR INTERVENTIONS: PERSISTENTLY LOWEST-
ACHIEVING SCHOOLS 2-7 (2010), available at http://www.ride.ri.gov/
ride/Docs/ProtocolforInterventions.pdf. RIDE has approved plans for 2011-
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Turnaround Model mandates that the principal be replaced and
no more than fifty percent of existing staff be retained,114 the
Restart Model contemplates a complete change in
administration,1 15 and the Transformation Model provides that
the principal be replaced and that teachers and principals
mutually consent to all staff assignments, regardless of
seniority.1 1 6
Although not as involved as state agencies in the day-to-day
supervision of local school districts, the federal government's
involvement in local education matters is not limited to the
development of intervention models at PLA Schools. For the last
decade, standardized tests in English and mathematics have been
administered to all students throughout the state in grades three
through eight pursuant to NCLB," 7 and recently, the federal
government has become even more involved in local education
matters as a result of its "Race to the Top" initiative. 118
Overlapping jurisdiction and responsibility between federal
2012 with respect to four PLA schools in the PPSD.
114. Id. at 4-5.
115. Id. at 5-6.
116. Id. at 6-7. As a result, it is likely that a significant number of PTU
teachers at PLA Schools will be displaced.
117. No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat.
1425 (2002) (codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 6301-7941); see also Rhode Island School
and District Accountability System, R.I. DEPT. OF ELEMENTARY AND
SECONDARY EDUc. (Mar. 2011), available at http://www.eride.ri.gov/reportcard
/11/documents/RlAccountabilitySystem-TechnicalBulletin.pdf.
118. Brill notes that President Obama's signature education initiative,
although committing less than one percent of the $600 billion spent on
education annually (a set aside of some five billion dollars of federal stimulus
funds), nonetheless caused, in Brill's words, "something unusual [to break]
out across America: a substantive policy debate that engaged a broad swath
of the citizenry and their elected officials in villages, cities, state capitals, and
in Washington . . . that actually produced results." BRILL, supra note 9, at 7.
As Brill recounts, the "Race to the Top" contest between the states involved:
[A] scoring system, totaling a maximum of five hundred points, that
tracked the reform network's agenda with exquisite specificity,
establishing six broad areas of reform, which were then divided into
nineteen subcategories, with each given a maximum point allocation
depending on how important it was believed to be in achieving real
reform. Although it was in nearly impenetrable language that
reflected all the cooks - including the lawyers - in the drafting
kitchen, it was a state-of-the-art blueprint for achieving the
reformers' agenda.
Id. at 259.
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and state education agencies and local school boards describe only
part of the dynamic. The application of state labor law often can
effectively prevent issues of education policy from even being
heard as such. Frequently, a policy that a school board may
believe is mandated by the BEP may be seen as the mere breach
of a CBA by a teachers union, arbitrator, or the SLRB, as has been
discussed.
Finally, one attempting to understand the legal and practical
dynamics of education policy in the state must also weigh the
influence of local and state politicians, as illustrated by recent
events in Providence. Even if mayors, city council members, and
state legislators do not have the express legal authority over
education policy conferred upon school boards and state agencies,
one ignores political power at one's peril, especially if unions are
involved, and especially in Rhode Island. After all, it is the
mayors and city councils-whose political fortunes are often
dramatically impacted by the comings and goings of school
superintendents-who appoint or endorse school board members
and actually fund school budgets. In Rhode Island (as in most
states), these politicians, more often than not, owe their positions
to the money and hard work contributed by labor unions,
especially the teachers unions. 119 To quote the former leader of
119. As Brill reports, from 1989 through 2010, the teachers unions
contributed some $60.7 million to candidates for federal office, with ninety-
five percent going to Democrats. BRILL, supra note 9, at 177. In fact, the two
national teachers unions-the National Education Association and its rival,
and more moderate, United Federation of Teachers-"donate three times
more money to Democrats than any other union or industry group" and their
members "account for more than 25 percent of all union members in the
country and 10-15 percent of the delegates to the Democratic Party
convention that chooses the presidential nominee." Id. at 2-3. Thus, as Brill
notes, "[i]f unions were the base of the Democratic Party, teachers were the
base of the base." Id. at 40.
The picture in Rhode Island is similar. According to the National
Institute on Money in State Politics, public sector labor unions in Rhode
Island contributed $402,123 to candidates for state office in 2010 alone, with
roughly a third coming from the teachers unions. See Rhode Island 2010,
NAT'L INST. ON MONEY IN STATE POLITIcs, http://www.followthemoney.org/
database/stateoverview.phtml?s=RI&y-2010 (last visited Feb. 5, 2012) (click
on "Contributors," then expand "Labor" and "Public Sector Unions"). Efforts
to stem the tide of union money have not met with much success. See, e.g.,
Commc'n Workers of Am. v. Christie, 994 A.2d 545, 573 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 2010) (Governor's executive order extending "pay-to-play" restrictions to
public sector labor unions violates separation of powers).
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one of the largest public sector labor unions in the country, the
unions 'have the ability, in a sense, to elect [their] own boss."' 20
B. Mayors and School Boards
To further complicate matters, tension between a mayor and a
city's school board are not unique to Providence. Indeed, such
tension is almost an expected outgrowth of their differing
constituencies and interests, although admittedly, rarely (if ever)
have such tensions prompted specific statewide legislation such as
the Jabour Act. The Act, which, as noted, transferred the "power
and duty" to negotiate and "enter into" CBAs from appointed
school boards to mayors, appears to be constitutional, as it applies
alike to all cities and towns and does not affect the form of
government of any city or town. 121 However, the Act raises as
120. Daniel Disalvo, The Trouble with Public Sector Unions, NAT'L AFF.,
Fall 2010, at 3, 10 (quoting Victor Gottbaum, in 1975, while serving as
AFSCME District Council 37 leader in New York City). Despite the stalwart
support teachers unions have provided to Democrats, it is hard to paint the
anti-union bias of the present education reform movement with an ideological
brush. As noted by one commentator:
Even President Franklin Roosevelt, a friend of private-sector
unionism, drew a line when it came to government workers:
"Meticulous attention," the president insisted in 1937, "should be
paid to the special relations and obligations of public servants to the
public itself and to the Government. . . . The process of collective
bargaining, as usually understood, cannot be transplanted into the
public service." The reason? F.D.R. believed that "[a] strike of
public employees manifests nothing less than an intent on their part
to obstruct the operations of government until their demands are
satisfied. Such action looking toward the paralysis of government by
those who have sworn to support it is unthinkable and intolerable."
Roosevelt was hardly alone in holding these views, even among the
champions of organized labor. Indeed, the first president of the AFL-
CIO, George Meany, believed it was "impossible to bargain
collectively with the government."
Id. at 6 (alterations in original).
121. On its face, the Act applies to every city and town throughout the
state, even if its practical application is limited to the one functionally non-
exempt city-Providence-with an appointed, as opposed to an elected, school
board. See R.I. GEN. LAws § 16-2-9(a)(18) (Supp. 2011). (Central Falls was
specifically exempted from the Act). Thus, it would appear to be "a general
act applicable to all cities and towns alike" within the meaning of Opinion to
the House of Representatives and Bruckshaw v. Paolino. 557 A.2d 1221, 1223
(R.I. 1989); 87 A.2d 693, 696 (R.I. 1952). In addition, it would not appear to
affect the form of government of any city or town within the meaning of
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many questions as it purports to answer by further clouding the
line dividing mayoral and school board control over education
policy.
As noted, in Providence, the City Charter describes the
powers of the PSB in the most sweeping fashion and makes
express reference to those powers and duties "imposed on school
boards by state law," 22 which, as discussed, are no less broad in
scope.123 As a matter of practice, CBAs involving the teachers
union in Providence historically have been signed by the School
Board.124 Mayoral administrations have been involved in
negotiating teachers' contracts to varying degrees. However, even
though the mayor functions as the chief executive officer of all
City departments,125 it would appear that under the Charter, any
authority the mayor might have had to negotiate a teachers'
contract prior to the Jabour Act would have been obtained,
whether expressly or impliedly, from the school board, which, as
noted, has sole power under the Charter "[t]o determine and
control all policies affecting the administration, maintenance and
operation of the public schools."1 26 What effect, if any, the Jabour
Act will have on this division of power in Providence remains
unclear, at least as of this writing.
What is clear under Rhode Island law is that "[a] state statute
preempts a local ordinance only when the Legislature manifests a
Marran v. Baird, at least if construed narrowly. 635 A.2d 1174, 1178-79 (R.I.
1994)
122. See PROVIDENCE HOME RULE CHARTER, supra note 1, § 706.
123. See GIST, supra note 69. Yet, the Charter does not expressly confer
the exclusive power to enter into CBAs upon either the School Board or the
Mayor. However, in Providence City Council v. Cianci, the Court, while
upholding a City ordinance mandating that all CBAs be ratified by the City
Council, made clear that the mayor did not have independent authority to
enter into a valid and binding contract with a public employees' union. See
650 A.2d 499, 502 (R.I. 1994). In addition, under the Charter, the Board's
power over financial matters is expressly circumscribed. See PROVIDENCE
HOME RULE CHARTER, supra note 1, §§ 707, 802-805. This point was made in
Providence Teachers Union v. Providence School Board, where the Court
noted that Home Rule Charter sections 706 and 707, clearly authorize the
city's mayor and its city council to not only control, but also to monitor the
school department's budget and expenditures. 689 A.2d 384, 386-88 (R.I.
1996).
124. See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAws § 28-9.3-2(a) (2003).
125. PROVIDENCE HOME RULE CHARTER, supra note 1, §§ 301, 302.
126. Id. § 706(a).
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clear intent to do so or when the statute and the ordinance are in
clear conflict."1 27 In addition, the Rhode Island Supreme Court
has affirmed that once the General Assembly ratifies a municipal
home rule charter, the Court "view[s] the conflicting charter
provision as 'a special act [that] takes precedence over any
inconsistent provisions of the general laws."'1 28 Moreover, as with
all statutes, municipal charters should be construed 'so as to give,
so far as possible, reasonable meaning and effect to all parts of the
section in question,"' 29 and the Rhode Island Supreme Court
adheres to the rule that when faced with 'competing statutory
provisions that cannot be harmonized ... the specific governs the
general . 1 . . ."'30
Thus, the powers conferred upon the PSB under state law
should be read together with those conferred under the City
Charter, and the Jabour Act must be read, if possible, so as to give
effect to these Charter provisions as well as each of the twenty-six
subsections contained in the statute that it purports to amend.131
When so read, it does not appear that transferring the "power and
duty" to negotiate and "enter into" teachers' contracts to the
mayor necessarily conflicts with the broad grants of power over
education policy expressly conferred upon school boards.132
Indeed, narrowly interpreted, a mayor's exercise of the powers
transferred under the Jabour Act would appear to be no different
from any chief executive officer's exercise of similar powers, which
in the normal course would be subordinate to clear policy
127. Providence City Council, 650 A.2d at 501 (citing Powers ex rel.
McGowan v. Jocelyn, 120 A.2d 143, 147 (R.I. 1956)).
128. Town of Johnston v. Santilli, 892 A.2d 123, 129 (R.I. 2006) (citing
Local No. 799, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. Napolitano, 516 A.2d 1347, 1349
(R.I. 1986)) (first alteration added).
129. Foster Glocester Reg'1 Sch. Bldg. Comm. v. Sette, 996 A.2d 1120,
1126 (R.I. 2010) (quoting Stewart v. Sheppard, 885 A.2d 715, 720 (R.I. 2005)).
130. Id. (quoting Felkner v. Chariho Reg'l Sch. Comm., 968 A.2d 865, 870
(R.I. 2009)); see also Providence Teachers Union, Local 958 v. Sch. Comm. of
Providence, 276 A.2d 762, 765 (R.I. 1971) ("Statutes which are not
inconsistent with one another and which relate to the same subject matter
are in pari materia and should be considered together so that they will
harmonize with each other and be consistent with their general object and
scope.").
131. See R.I. GEN. LAws § 16-2-9(a) (Supp. 2011).
132. Id. § 16-2-9(a)(18).
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directives from a board of directors. 133 Yet, how any legislative
act is construed often is decided as much by who does the
construing as by what would appear to be the applicable law.
C. Possible Forums for Resolving Disputes Involving Public
Education
Determining whether an action raises issues which primarily
involve: (1) "laws relating to elementary and secondary schools
and education," and thus remains within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of RIDE; 134 or (2) permissive or mandatory subjects of
collective bargaining, and thus within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the SLRB,135 is rarely simple, as has been
discussed. In addition, the task can be complicated by the need to
determine whether the Superior Court has jurisdiction under the
Rhode Island Declaratory Judgment Act ("RIDJA")136 or whether
there is federal question jurisdiction.
The RIDJA provides that the Superior Court has the power
to:
[D]eclare rights, status, and other legal relations whether
or not further relief is or could be claimed ... The
declaration may be either affirmative or negative in form
and effect; and such declarations shall have the force and
effect of a final judgment or decree.137
133. See, e.g., Fournier v. Fournier, 479 A.2d 708, 712 (R.I. 1984) ("Too
broad a delegation of powers, either express or implied, may be interpreted as
an unlawful abdication by the board of directors of its management
functions.").
134. The comprehensive legislation establishing the authority of the
Regents and of the Commissioner over public education clearly delegates to
the Commissioner the authority to interpret state education law. R.I. GEN.
LAWS §§ 16-1-5, 16-60-6 (2001 & Supp. 2011).
135. See id. § 28-7-21 (2003). The SLRB is responsible for, among other
things, conducting union elections, certifying collective bargaining
representatives, and hearing and deciding ULPCs. See id. § 28-7-9 & -21.
ULPC's are filed with the SLRB, and then heard on appeal by the Superior
Court. See id. § 28-9-25. It also should be noted that most teachers' contracts
provide for mandatory arbitration. For example, in Providence, CBA Article
15-2.3 mandates arbitration if there are contract issues in dispute, which,
again, would be appealable to the Superior Court. See id.
136. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-30-1 to -16 (1997).
137. Id. § 9-30-1.
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However, jurisdiction under the RIDJA is largely discretionary,138
and under the doctrine of administrative exhaustion a plaintiff
may not be able to simply ignore mandatory CBA grievance and
arbitration procedures, and/or elect not to file either a state ULPC
(exclusive jurisdiction over which resides with the SLRB in the
normal course) or a claim under the Tenure Act. 139
138. See Sullivan v. Chafee, 703 A.2d 748, 751 (R.I. 1997) ("The decision to
grant or to deny declaratory relief under the [DJA] is purely discretionary.").
In State v. Cianci, the court added that "[t]he main prerequisite to successful
prosecution of an action for declaratory judgment is the existence of an actual
or justiciable controversy." 496 A.2d 139, 146 (R.I. 1985). As the Rhode
Island Supreme Court has noted:
[A] necessary predicate to a court's exercise of its jurisdiction under
the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act is an actual justiciable
controversy." By definition, a justiciable controversy must contain a
plaintiff who has standing to pursue the action; that is to say, a
plaintiff who has suffered "injury in fact." Injury in fact may be
characterized as "an invasion of a legally protected interest which is
(a) concrete and particularized . . . and (b) actual or imminent, not
'conjectural' or 'hypothetical."' Furthermore, justiciability is not
present unless the facts of the case yield some legal hypothesis
which will entitle the plaintiff to real and articulable relief.
Meyer v. City of Newport, 844 A.2d 148, 151 (R.I. 2004) (citations omitted)
(alterations in original).
139. See Laura V. v. Providence Sch. Bd., 680 F.Supp. 66, 68-69 (D.R.I.
1988) (dismissing claim under federal Education for All Handicapped
Children Act, 20 U.S.C. §1400); Jacob v. Burke, 296 A.2d 456, 459 (R.I. 1972)
(dismissing state Teacher Tenure Act claim). The administrative exhaustion
doctrine was explained and justified by the Rhode Island Supreme Court as
follows: "'Requiring the exhaustion of administrative remedies (1) aids
judicial review by allowing the parties and the agency to develop the facts of
the case, and (2) it promotes judicial economy by avoiding needless repetition
of administrative and judicial factfinding, perhaps avoiding the necessity of
any judicial involvement." Doe v. E. Greenwich Sch. Dept., 899 A.2d 1258,
1266 (R.I. 2006) (quoting Almeida v. Plasters' & Cement Masons' Local 40
Pension Fund, 722 A.2d 257, 259 (R.I. 1998)). Dismissal (or remand) would
be mandated under the doctrine unless plaintiff could establish that:
(1) the administrative process would be "futile or inadequate;" (2) the
administrative process would "waste resources, and work severe or
irreparable harm on the litigant;" (3) the issues raised "involve
purely legal questions;" or (4) the agency prevents "the litigant from
pursuing [his or] her claim at the administrative level."
Id. (quoting Pihl v. Mass. Dept. of Educ., 9 F.3d 184, 190-91 (1st Cir. 1993));
see also Arnold v. Lebel, 941 A.2d 813, 818 (R.I. 2007) (not mandated when
futile with respect to the relief sought); Almeida, 722 A.2d at 259 (exhaustion
not mandated); Newbay Corp. v. Annarummo, 587 A.2d 63, 64-66 (R.I. 1991)
(exhaustion not mandated where agency practice interferes with or threatens
to impair the rights or privileges of a party).
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In addition, declaratory relief is not generally appropriate in
the absence of some particularized injury in fact.140 That being
said, the Rhode Island Supreme Court has recognized that this
general requirement should not be applied mechanically in cases
involving "extreme public importance." 41 Also, it may be that in
certain cases involving public education none of the relevant
administrative forums have the ability to decide all of the
material, legal issues and/or to provide complete relief to the
parties, not to mention the impossibility of obtaining needed relief
in a timely manner. In cases such as this, it is delay itself that
constitutes the contemplated "injury in fact." 42
140. The Rhode Island Supreme Court has noted:
[T]he mere fact that a court is being asked to render an advisory
opinion does not automatically preclude a declaratory judgment in
all situations. This court previously has held that the rule against
judicial consideration of moot, abstract, academic, or hypothetical
questions is not absolute. But in such cases the issuance of
declaratory relief has been deemed appropriate only when the
question(s) presented, although technically moot or deficient in some
other respect, involved issues "of extreme public importance, which
are capable of repetition but which evade review."
Sullivan, 703 A.2d at 752 (internal citation omitted).
141. See, e.g., In re Amanda M., 626 A.2d 1277, 1278 (R.I. 1993)
(clarifying obligation of Department of Children, Youth and Families to make
rent payments); Burns v. Sundlun, 617 A.2d 114, 116 (R.I. 1992) (addressing
the right of the public to vote at a public referendum on a matter of local
interest); Providence Journal Co. v. Superior Court, 593 A.2d 446, 448 (R.I.
1991) (addressing the issue of a closure of trial court during voir dire
examination of prospective jurors); Gelch v. State Bd. of Elections, 482 A.2d
1204, 1207 (R.I. 1984) (addressing a citizen's eligibility to hold public office);
Morris v. D'Amario, 416 A.2d 137, 139 (R.I. 1980) (a bail case). This is in
marked contrast to the narrow view of such jurisdiction expressed by the
Superior Court in Portsmouth School Committee v. NEA Portsmouth. No. PC
11-3239, slip op. at 6 (R.I. Super. Ct. Nov. 7, 2011), available at
http://www.courts.ri.gov/Courts/SuperiorCourt/DecisionsOrders/decisions/11-
3239.pdf.
142. See R.I. Ophthalmological Soc'y v. Cannon, 317 A.2d 124, 129-31
(R.I. 1974). As the Court has noted:
We do not believe that it would be an economical use of our judicial
resources to require the parties simultaneously to pursue judicial
review in separate forums. It makes a good deal more sense to us to
hold that the jurisdiction of the Superior Court, when invoked
pursuant to [Rhode Island General Laws] § 16-13-4, extends to the
entire case, including issues raised on cross-appeal by a party who
otherwise would have had no right of appeal to the Superior Court.
Barber v. Exeter-West Greenwich Sch. Comm., 418 A.2d 13, 17 (R.I. 1980)
(citations omitted).
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Issues occupying the space between education policy and
labor law also have the potential to involve the federal courts. In
almost all cases involving a teachers union and a school board, a
federal court's jurisdiction is dependent upon the existence of
federal-question jurisdiction because in such cases all parties
likely would be citizens of the same state. 143  The presence or
absence of federal-question jurisdiction is governed by the "well-
pleaded complaint rule,"1 44 which provides that jurisdiction exists
only when a federal question is presented on the face of a
plaintiffs properly pleaded complaint.145
For example, in the PTU's recent attempt to secure a federal
forum to challenge a CBH policy in Providence, the union relied
primarily upon the Contract Clause of the United States
Constitution 46 and NCLB.147 Although the existence of federal
143. In addition, it should be noted that any attempt to remove a state
court action likely would be complicated by the "unanimity requirement." As
has been noted:
Where the action involves multiple defendants . . . the right of
removal is subject to the so-called "unanimity requirement.".. .
The unanimity requirement is derived from 28 U.S.C. § 1446, which
sets forth the procedure for removing a state action to federal court.
In a case where a plaintiff has sued multiple defendants in state
court, an "all for one and one for all" rule applies with respect to
removal. That is, subject to a few exceptions not applicable here, all
defendants must consent to remove the case for removal to be effected.
Esposito v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 590 F.3d 72, 75 (1st Cir. 2009)
(emphasis added) (citations omitted).
144. Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987).
145. See id.
146. The Contract Clause prohibits states from passing "any ... Law
impairing the Obligation of Contracts." U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. The
relevant jurisprudence was succinctly set forth by Judge Selya, who noted:
[A] court first must inquire whether a contract exists. If so, the
court next must inquire whether the law in question impairs an
obligation under the contract. If so, the court then must inquire
whether the discerned impairment can fairly be characterized as
substantial. Affirmative answers to these three queries compel a
court to abrogate the proposed application of the challenged state
law.
McGrath v. R.I. Ret. Bd., 88 F.3d 12, 16 (1st Cir. 1996).
147. The PTU also cited the federal Declaratory Judgment Act (the
"DJA"). 28 U.S.C. § 2201. However, the DJA is not a substitute for the lack
of a federal question. As the First Circuit has noted, the DJA
[Merely "makes available an added anodyne for disputes that come
within the federal courts' jurisdiction on some other basis." Thus
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jurisdiction under the Contract Clause must be determined with
reference to particular facts, generally speaking, it would seem
that the statutory scheme developed by the state to implement the
CES, SALT, and the BEP, as well as RIDE's method of progressive
control over troubled schools and districts pursuant to that
scheme, would be considered to be in furtherance of an important
public purpose, which would often preclude federal jurisdiction. 148
In addition, the administrative relief and recourse to the courts
"[t]here must be an independent basis of jurisdiction . . . before a
federal court may entertain a declaratory-judgment action." Section
2201 is the cart; plaintiff still needs a horse.
Alberto San, Inc. v. Consejo De Titulares Del Condominio San Alberto, 522
F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2008) (citations omitted); see also N. Am. Catholic Educ.
Programming Found., Inc. v. Sprint Corp., No. C.A. 04-473 T, 2006 WL
1207670, at *4 n.5 (D.R.I. May 2, 2006) ("The Declaratory Judgment Act, 28
U.S.C. § 2201, does not provide an independent basis for federal
jurisdiction.").
148. In McGrath, Judge Selya added that "this tripartite test actually has
a fourth component. In an appropriate case the model expands to include an
inquiry as to whether the impairment, albeit substantial, is reasonable and
necessary to fulfill an important public purpose." McGrath, 88 F.3d at 16
(citing Energy Reserves Grp. v. Kan. Power & Light, 459 U.S. 400, 411-12
(1983)). As the Supreme Court has noted:
The States must possess broad power to adopt general regulatory
measures without being concerned that private contracts will be
impaired, or even destroyed, as a result. Otherwise, one would be
able to obtain immunity from the state regulation by making private
contractual arrangements. This principle is summarized in Mr.
Justice Holmes' well-known dictum: "One whose rights, such as they
are, are subject to state restriction, cannot remove them from the
power of the State by making a contract about them."
U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 22 (1977) (quoting Hudson
Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 357 (1908)); see also Oliver v. Trunkline
Gas Co., 796 F.2d 86, 89-90 (5th Cir. 1986) ("[W]e are aware of no cases in
which any court . . . has held that a private contract can give rise to federal-
question jurisdiction simply by 'incorporating' some federal regulatory
standard that would not have been binding on the parties by its own force.");
New Jersey State AFL-CIO v. State of New Jersey, 747 F.2d 891, 892 (3d.
Cir. 1984) (rejecting allegation of Contract Clause jurisdiction where
underlying claim did not arise under federal law); Danfelt v. Bd. of Cnty.
Comm'rs, 998 F. Supp. 606, 608 (D. Md. 1998) (observing that federal
jurisdiction over a state-created claim with an embedded federal component
will not lie when the federal statute at issue did not create a private cause of
action); J.A. Jones Constr. Co. v. City of New York, 753 F. Supp. 497, 505
(S.D.N.Y. 1990) (refusing to assert federal jurisdiction over what was
essentially a state-law breach of contract claim merely because the parties'
contract incorporated federal regulations as a method to calculate payment).
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built into the state's statutory scheme to implement education
policy1 49  would not seem to support Contract Clause
jurisdiction.150
As an independent corollary to the well-pleaded complaint
rule, the "complete preemption doctrine" posits that "Congress
may so completely preempt a particular area [of law] that any civil
complaint raising this select group of claims is necessarily federal
in character."1 51 Such complete pre-emption would not appear to
be the case in most cases involving education policy. As noted, the
PTU recently invoked NCLB in support of its federal. claim
against the PSB. However, NCLB expressly provides that it
should not be construed so as to "alter or otherwise affect the
rights, remedies, and procedures afforded school or school district
employees under Federal, State, or local laws . . ."152 In addition,
"every court to have considered the question whether the NCLBA
creates a private right of action has answered that question in the
149. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
150. Judge Posner has noted that Contract Clause analysis "is trickier"
when it is applied to public, as opposed to private, contracts. See Horwitz-
Matthews, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 78 F.3d 1248, 1250 (7th Cir. 1996). "It
would be absurd," he claims, "to turn every breach of contract by a state or
municipality into a violation of the federal Constitution." Id. As Judge
Posner explains:
The cases struggle to articulate the distinction. They differentiate
between a mere breach of contract and a measure that defeats the
promisee's "reasonable" or "legitimate" "expectations," or between a
mere breach and a repudiation of the contractual obligation itself, or
between a measure that leaves the promisee with a remedy in
damages for breach of contract and one that extinguishes the remedy.
Id. (emphasis added); see also Univ. of Haw. Prof'l. Assembly v. Cayetano,
183 F.3d 1096, 1108 (9th Cir. 1999) (emphasizing the need to show a
deprivation of all remedies in absence of jurisdiction).
151. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63-64 (1987); see
also Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust for S. Cal., 463
U.S. 1, 22-24 (1983) (complete preemption doctrine serves as independent
corollary to well-pleaded complaint rule).
152. See 20 U.S.C. § 6316(d); see also Rogers v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 308
F.3d 785, 791 (7th Cir. 2002) ("Ordinary [as opposed to complete] preemption
is an affirmative defense that [a party] may assert in state court; it is not a
basis for federal jurisdiction under the complete preemption doctrine.");
Smith v. GTE Corp., 236 F.3d 1292, 1313 (11th Cir. 2001) ("[O]ur conclusion
that the complete preemption doctrine does not provide a basis for federal
jurisdiction in this action does not preclude the parties from litigating [the
defense of ordinary preemption] in any subsequent state court action.").
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negative."153
Moreover, the doctrine of administrative exhaustion may
preclude a court from exercising whatever federal-question
jurisdiction might exist.154 Finally, Rhode Island's constitutional
reference to public schools and the unique manner by which the
state imposes and enforces uniform educational standards, as well
as the interplay between this effort and the equally specific labor
law policies that the state has developed, presents the kind of
backdrop that has prompted federal courts to abstain from
exercising jurisdiction, or to stay the action pending clarification
under state law. 5 5
153. Alliance for Children, Inc. v. City of Detroit Pub. Sch., 475 F. Supp.
2d 655, 658 (E.D. Mich. 2007) (citing Fresh Start Acad. v. Toledo Bd. of Educ.,
363 F. Supp. 2d 910 (N.D. Ohio 2005); ACORN v. N.Y. City Dept. of Educ.,
269 F. Supp. 2d 338 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Stokes ex rel. K.F. v. U.S. Dept. of
Educ., C.A. 05-11764, 2006 WL 1892242 (D. Mass. July 10, 2006); Blanchard
ex rel. Blanchard v. Morton Sch. Dist., No. C06-5166, 2006 WL 2459167 (W.D.
Wash. Aug. 25, 2006); Coachella Valley Unified Sch. Dist. v. California, No. C
05-02657, 2005 WL 1869499 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2005)).
154. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
155. The doctrine of ripeness, like the doctrine of administrative
exhaustion, "reflects constitutional considerations that implicate 'Article III
limitations on judicial power,' as well as 'prudential reasons for refusing to
exercise jurisdiction."' Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 130
S.Ct. 1758, 1767 n.2 (2010) (quoting Reno v. Catholic Soc. Servs., Inc., 509
U.S. 43, 57 n.18 (1993)). As the First Circuit has noted, "[t]he ripeness
doctrine is designed to prevent courts from 'entangling themselves in abstract
disagreements over administrative policies' and from improperly interfering
in the administrative decision-making process." City of Fall River v. Fed.
Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 507 F.3d 1, 6-7 (1st Cir. 2007) (quoting Abbott
Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-49 (1967), overruled on other grounds by
Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977)); see also Perry v. Sindermann, 408
U.S. 593, 603 (1972) (Burger, J., concurring) ("[T]he relationship between a
state institution and one of its teachers is essentially a matter of state
concern and state law.").
The Pullman abstention doctrine, which rests on the desirability of
having federal courts avoid unnecessary rulings on constitutional issues, also
may be applicable. See R.R. Comm'n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496,
500-01 (1941); Rivera-Puig v. Garcia-Rosario, 983 F.2d 311, 321-22 (1st Cir.
1992). As noted by the First Circuit, "federal courts should abstain when
state law is uncertain, and a clarification of the law in a pending state court
case might make the federal court's constitutional ruling unnecessary."
Rivera-Puig, 983 F.2d at 321-22; see also Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S.
315, 334 (1943) ("a sound respect for the independence of state action
requir[ed] the federal equity court to stay its hand" and not interfere with the
centralized system of juridical review of state Railroad Commission orders in
Texas). Subsequently, in Younger v. Harris, the Court held that absent
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IV. CONCLUSION
Almost thirty years ago, President Ronald Reagan's
Commission on Excellence in Education gave birth to the modern
education reform movement by publishing what has been
described as "the all-time blockbuster of education reports."15 6
The report, A Nation at Risk: The Imperative for Educational
Reform, opened with the claim that "the educational foundations
of our society are presently being eroded by a rising tide of
mediocrity that threatens our very future as a nation and a
people."l 57
It is now clear that risk has become reality,158 especially in
our cities, a reality that is being enabled, in part, by our legal
system's inability to effectively distinguish between rules
applicable to public education and those pertinent to collective
bargaining. Without brighter lines to untangle core policy issues
involving public education from the grist of the collective
bargaining mill, meaningful education reform will continue to
stumble.
One way to help untangle these issues is to insist that those
who decide what is essential to the educational mission of a school
board and thus exempt from collective bargaining should, at least
in the first instance, actually have some expertise in the field of
public education. If difficult policy decisions, especially the task of
identifying the essential educational mission of school boards, are
controlled by those who lack necessary expertise and/or who
extraordinary circumstances, federal courts should not enjoin pending state
criminal prosecutions. 401 U.S. 37, 41 (1971). This concern caused the
Supreme Court to apply the rationale of Younger various civil as well as
criminal contexts. See, e.g., New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New
Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 367-68 (1989). In addition to abstaining under
Burford and progeny, the U.S. Supreme Court also has held that
[I]n cases where the relief being sought is equitable in nature or
otherwise discretionary, federal courts not only have the power to
stay the action based on abstention principles, but can also, in
otherwise appropriate circumstances, decline to exercise jurisdiction
altogether by either dismissing the suit or remanding it to state
court [under the Colorado River stay doctrine.]
See Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 721 (1996).
156. See RAVITCH, supra note 9, at 24.
157. Nat'l Comm'n on Excellence in Educ., A Nation at Risk: The
Imperative for Educational Reform, 84 ELEMENTARY SCH. J. 112, 112 (1983).
158. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
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depend upon the continued good will of the teachers unions, the
results of these decisions, while predictable, may not necessarily
be in the best interests of students.1 5 9 On the other hand, if such
decisions are made by those who actually have been trained in
education policy, or at least by those who have been specifically
selected by the General Assembly to decide education policy
issues, the boundary between Titles 16 (Education) and 28 (Labor
and Labor Relations) of the Rhode Island General Laws likely will
be clarified. Indeed, in other contexts the Rhode Island Supreme
Court has recognized that courts should defer to those with the
requisite expertise whom the General Assembly has expressly
selected to make policy decisions in a specific area. 160
Thus, in the best of worlds, a school board's claim that it is
acting pursuant to non-delegable management rights should be
evaluated by RIDE, and it is suggested that neither the SLRB nor
an arbitrator selected by the parties, who more likely than not
lack both relevant expertise as well as the legislative authority to
make policy decisions in the field of public education,16' should
exercise jurisdiction over such claims. Indeed, legislation should
159. Brill notes that it always confounded New York City Schools
Chancellor Joel Klein that UFT President Randi Weingarten, who is a
lawyer, "never admitt[ed] who her real-and only-clients were. Her
counterparts at the rival NEA had no compunction about whom they worked
for. But Weingarten's line was always that what was good for teachers was
always good for children." BRILL, supra note 9, at 101. Brill quotes longtime
NEA general counsel Robert Chanin who, in a valedictory speech on the eve
of his retirement opined that his union was effective:
[N]ot because we care about children, and it is not because we have a
vision of a great public school for every child. NEA and its affiliates
are effective advocates because we have power. And we have power
because there are more than 3.2 million people who are willing to
pay us hundreds of millions of dollars in dues each year because they
believe that we are the unions that can most effectively represent
them . . . protect their rights and advance their interests. . . . When
all is said and done . . . NEA and its affiliates must never lose sight
of the fact that they are unions, and what unions do first and
foremost is represent their members.
Id. at 250 (first and second omission in original).
160. See, e.g., Robert E. Derecktor of R.I., Inc. v. United States, 762 F.
Supp. 1019, 1022 (D.R.I. 1991) ("Where an agency's decision is highly
technical, and specialized knowledge is required, judicial deference is
necessary."); cf. Chambers v. Ormiston, 935 A.2d 956, 965 (R.I. 2007) ("The
role of the judicial branch is not to make policy.").
161. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
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be enacted to create a rebuttable presumption that RIDE has
exclusive jurisdiction under Title 16 over a school board's claim
that a challenged action was mandated by a statute, the BEP, or
an integral part of the school board's essential educational
mission. Such legislation, it is suggested, would help to ensure
that policy issues impacting public education are decided by those
with appropriate expertise and authority.162
Of course, it is clear that we do not live in the best of worlds.
Thus, in the absence of the suggested legislation, courts should
not hesitate to stay SLRB actions and/or arbitration proceedings
involving public education policy and remand them to RIDE, when
appropriate. By the same token, the courts should make clear
that these remanded cases should be decided by RIDE narrowly so
as not to intrude upon the legitimate original jurisdiction of the
SLRB to decide matters which truly concern "terms and conditions
of employment," and which do not necessarily intrude upon core
policy issues.
Admittedly, to date, RIDE has been hesitant to inject itself
into what have been too easily characterized as labor contract
disputes between school boards and teachers unions. However,
the BEP will have little effect if RIDE is unwilling to aggressively
and creatively exercise the broad jurisdiction over education policy
that it has been granted by the General Assembly.163 In fact, even
if willing and even if its jurisdiction to hear relevant claims is
protected, RIDE will not succeed in promoting and enforcing the
BEP unless it is provided with necessary financial resources and,
162. This would be quite different from the legislation enacted in
Wisconsin, Ohio and New Jersey, which carves out specific areas that are per
se outside the realm of collective bargaining. See supra note 87.
163. See supra note 112 and accompanying text; see also PAUL HILL &
PATRICK MURPHY, CTR. ON REINVENTING PUB. EDUC., WORKING PAPER #2011-3,
ON RECOVERY SCHOOL DISTRICTS AND STRONGER STATE EDUCATION AGENCIES:
LESSONS FROM LOUISIANA (2011), available at http://www.crpe.org/cs/crpel
download/csr files/WPStatesRecoveryJunll.pdf (using recent success in
Louisiana to suggest that state educational agencies, like RIDE, need to
create new structures and acquire additional resources to promote change in
urban districts); Sarah Yatsko & Melissa Bowen, CTR. ON REINVENTING PUB.
EDUC., 2011 PIE NETWORK SUMMIT POLICY BRIEFS, BEATING THE ODDS: How
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just as importantly, political independence, and unless the Rhode
Island Supreme Court liberalizes the constricted view of school
board management rights it expressed thirty-five years ago in
Belanger v. Matteson.164
If additional clarity as to the appropriate contours of collective
bargaining is not provided and if RIDE's ability to promote and
enforce the BEP is not enhanced, it is likely that most disputes
between school boards and teachers unions will continue to be
based upon the economic concerns of interested adults, rather
than upon the educational needs of students. Tragically, the real
cost of our continued inability to reverse this unfortunate dynamic
will be borne, not by the state's taxpayers, but by its poorest
children.
164. See supra notes 45-49 and accompanying text.
